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Foreword
IIASA, the Russian Academy of Sciences and several Russian governmental agencies,
have in agreement carried out a large-scale study on the Russian forest sector.  The
overall objective of the study is to focus on policy options that would encourage sus-
tainable development of the sector.
The first phase of the study concentrated on the generation of extensive and consistent
databases for the total forest sector.
In its second phase, the study encompassed assessment studies of the greenhouse gas
balances, forest resources and forest utilization, biodiversity and landscapes, non-wood
products and functions, environmental status, transportation infrastructure, forest indus-
try and markets, and socio-economics.
Through these assessment studies, it has become clear that a changed institutional
framework is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable development of the Russian forest
sector.
This report describes the results of initial analyses of the institutional framework of the
Russian forest sector and outlines future research needed in this field.
Professor Sten Nilsson
Project Leader
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Chapter 1
Institutional Analysis of the Russian
Forest Sector
Lars Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson
The Soviet Union no longer exists and the Russian people are faced with the tremen-
dous task of reorganizing their society. Literally out of the “ruins” of the old system
they have to create something new and this “new” should be accomplished rather soon.
This is the belief of many western observers but it is also a wish among all those who
suffer from the present situation and for whom the “blessings” of the market economy
still are to be enjoyed. However the challenge to reorganize society does not only entail
the introduction of a market economy. In reality, the task contains three sub-tasks that
must be handled simultaneously, namely, 1) to restructure the economy, 2) state-
building, and finally, 3) nation-building, i.e., to establish Russia as a nation (Breslauer,
1995).
The magnitude of this challenge cannot be overstated but, at the same time, significant
progress has already been achieved in some parts of the economy. The fact that Russia,
with its vast forest areas, possesses a significant economic resource has raised, or per-
haps even inflated, the general expectations of the economic contribution from this
sector. Since forest resources are enormous so is the economic output from the sector,
especially after the introduction of “a market mechanism.” So goes the argumentation.
However, the statement that Russian forests are a significant resource only reflects a
common sense attitude. There is no one-to-one relation between the size of a natural
resource and its economic, or its utility, value. The situation in a great number of devel-
oping counties, as well as the situation in Russia, illustrate this fact. Developing coun-
tries often possess significant resources, but due to political, organizational and techno-
logical factors their resources are not contributing to the well-being of their people. Ac-
cordingly, forests are not resources per se. Only within a framework of institutional ar-
rangements can a forest resource be regarded as an asset in an economic sense.
Generally, in the literature, a resource is something that is considered useful and valu-
able in the condition it is found (cf. for example Randall, 1987: 12). However, the at-
traction of a resource cannot be defined instantly or once and for all. Two other features
are necessary for making a natural resource a valuable asset. The first is technology and
the second is the institutional structure embedding the resource (Kant & Nautiyal,
1992). Technology within forestry, as well as within all other sectors, is defined by the
state and the quality of physical capital, but also by the human capital that is involved in
the activities related to the resource. The structure, usefulness and appropriateness of
2technology are closely related to the other general features of a resource, namely, the
institutional arrangements. Without adequate institutional arrangements any technology
might be completely worthless (Kant & Nautiyal, 1992: 7).
Institutions are “the rules of the game” (North, 1990), and without them no economic or
social activity can take place. Institutions facilitate the interaction between people and
organizations. Systems of rules – well developed and configured – are a basic pre-
requisite for markets to run smoothly (Milgrom et al., 1990). Institutions provide stabil-
ity, they regulate and safeguard trade, and they make economic and social action fore-
seeable. Accordingly, institutions are essential to keep transaction costs on a socially
acceptable level. With easy access to reliable institutional arrangements, costs for con-
tracting and conflict resolution are kept on a low level, compared to a situation where
such arrangements are loose or absent.
Thus, in order to become a valuable economic asset the Russian forest resources are de-
pendent on the existence of close relations between technological development and in-
stitutional reconstruction. Massive investments in forest technology, for example, are
not fruitful if such a technological renewal takes place in an institutional vacuum unable
to accommodate the process. Stable institutional arrangements are required for such
transactions to produce expected results.
In a market economy businesses are used to taking risks. Earning and losing money is
something that is built into the very system of a market economy. On the other hand,
under the umbrella of a well functioning market economy, actors, such as entrepreneurs,
banks, and traders, try to share some of the risks associated with their behavior. The
system also gives the actors the possibility of insuring themselves against some of the
possible market failures they might encounter. Security for loans, arbitrage, and devel-
oped and accepted procedures in case of bankruptcy, are some of these insurance
mechanisms.
However, while enterprises might be used to taking business risks they cannot handle
“political risks,” i.e., the risks associated with qualities of the political system. Eliasson,
et al. (1994: 13 ff.) distinguish between three types of political risks: collapse of the en-
tire political system, breakdown of the economy, and unpredictable behavior by gov-
ernmental authorities. Political risks “are ‘systemic’ in the sense that rules governing
economic transactions can be abolished, or changed, without enforcement possibilities”
(Eliasson et al., 1994: 15). However, entrepreneurial behavior and long-term financial
commitments in the Russian forest sector would require that firms mainly have to
bother with business risks, those emanating from mistaken decisions, bad calculations,
misjudgments, and so forth. Therefore, it is “the task of political authorities to minimize
or eliminate political risks as a means of achieving economic growth” (Eliasson et al.,
1994: 13). The empirical reality behind this statement contradicts a widespread idea that
the introduction of a market economy automatically would mean the same as having a
passive state (Hodgson, 1989; Eggertsson, 1990: 59 ff.). In conclusion, what is needed
to make the Russian forest sector work is a well-functioning institutional framework
that has a quality that allows business actors to concentrate on business activities while
at the same time forest resources are treated in a sustainable way.
More precisely, when referring to institutional arrangements relevant for forestry, we
mean, among other things, the existence of market information systems, rules, technol-
ogy, and so forth. We also refer to the clarity and simplicity of rules of trade, financing,
contracting, etc. Finally, we refer to a whole cluster of variables related to property
3rights, e.g., ownership, usufruct rights, monitoring and sanctioning of infringements,
etc.
The old institutional arrangement, which has its basis in the specific property rights re-
gime developed during the socialist period, is neither possible nor desirable to keep. So-
cio-economic development requires new institutions to facilitate the processes. The for-
estry sector can be expected to play a substantial and significant role in this develop-
ment. Trade, transport, management, marketing, etc., and, in the end, the sustainable
utilization of the entire Russian forest resource, is dependent on the establishment of
such a framework.
Lack of Theory and Knowledge
The reconstruction of the former economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union (FSU) has thrown new light on economic theory and its usefulness has been
questioned. In fact, it seems that we lack good theories of how such a reconstruction can
(or should preferably) be performed. As Benham et al. (1995: 1) puts it: “While eco-
nomic theory expounds upon the workings of a market system, it does not tell us how to
build one.” The same goes for mainstream political theory with its focus on formal po-
litical structure. Traditional political theory, which presupposes an already existing
state, does not provide appropriate guidance for on-going or desirable activities aimed at
building such a system of governance.
Institutional arrangement are path dependent, they either reside in or are ultimately de-
pendent upon a local context to work and survive (Putnam et al., 1993; Kaminski, 1992;
Benham et al., 1995; Ostrom et al., 1994). Therefore, they are also hard to change
through a top-down approach. By providing particular incentives public policies might
discourage or encourage specific types of behavior. But, the basic structure of the local
context is hard to change, and it is in this environment that local actors operate. Institu-
tional arrangements are formed by the daily activities performed by those who are in-
volved in the business. However, as Benham et al. (1995) argue, most economic reform
proposals are based on a top-down approach. At the same time neo-institutional eco-
nomics tells us that institutions are evolutionary products, and that they are developed
primarily from below.
The lessons of history also underpin the necessity of a credible state (North & Weingast,
1989) which can serve as an ultimate guarantor for property rights. But, in the long run,
the state cannot guarantee anything without the support from lower level institutions –
formal or informal – upon which its authority is based. Therefore, it is quite logical to
argue – as Behnam et al. (1995) do – that the major task for Eastern Europe is to try to
move away from old sets of norms, rules and mental models. This will be done through
the creation of new institutional arrangements based on and, at the same time, guiding
local activities. Such a task is definitely relevant for the forest sector as well. The cru-
cial question is, however, how such a development can be accomplished?
The Role of Institutional Analysis in the
IIASA Forest Project
During the course of the IIASA Sustainable Boreal Forest Resources Project significant
knowledge has been accumulated concerning different aspects of the Russian forests
4(Nilsson & Shvidenko, 1997). During the conference “Dialogue on Sustainable Devel-
opment of the Russian Forest Sector” in Moscow, November 12-14, 1996, the idea of
expanding the project deliberately to include institutional aspects was presented. The
purpose of this presentation was to launch the project idea and to discuss its contents
with the community researchers and official stakeholders involved in the project. A
further aim was to establish contacts with qualified and interested Russian collaborators.
Two broad questions were discussed as a possible guideline for a future institutional
analysis of the Russian forest sector:
1) What is the exact configuration of the present institutional framework related to
Russian forestry and its historical roots? How do central characteristics and features
of this framework correspond with the possibility of a sustainable exploitation of
Russian forests?
2) Compared to the forestry sectors in other countries (e.g., Sweden, Finland, Canada,
etc.), to what extent are crucial characteristics different or lacking? In what respect
are such characteristics and prerequisites for markets already established or on their
way to evolving?
It was also argued that it would be desirable to conduct a number of case studies in dif-
ferent parts of Russia and that the result of these studies should fertilize the Russian dis-
cussion about how to reorganize the forest sector. Based on previous experiences, where
a similar methodology has been used (Duinker et al., 1993), a number of “policy exer-
cises” should be organized. This idea is still on a future agenda.
From Idea to Reality
In the spring of 1997, IIASA initiated a pilot study explicitly concentrating on institu-
tional aspects of the forest sector in Tomsk oblast (Carlsson & Olsson, 1998). In order
to contribute to this new angle of the IIASA Sustainable Boreal Forest Resources Proj-
ect three students were accepted in the institute’s Young Scientists Summer Program
(YSSP) of 1997 to work with institutional issues. During the course of the summer
Tomas Malmlöf, Barbara Lehmbruch, and Olga Mashkina all worked with different
topics related to the institutional aspects of the Russian forest sector. The results of their
work is presented in this volume.
In the next chapter, The Institutional Framework of the Russian Forest Sector, A His-
torical Background, Tomas Malmlöf gives an overview of the historical roots of the
current organization of the Russian forest sector. Malmlöf describes the long history of
Russian forestry and how the Czar and his later successors have looked upon the forest
resource. He also emphasizes that the open access quality of the Russian forests has a
long tradition and that the emerging Soviet State could encapsulate this tradition. This,
in combination with the existence of vast forest resources, fostered a behavior that has
been labeled the “legacy of overuse” (World Bank, 1997), i.e., an unsustainable forest
management. This behavior is a good example of what we earlier referred to as path de-
pendence, namely, that institutional features have a tendency to survive or even be rec-
reated under new historical circumstances. Malmlöf ends his chapter by listing a num-
ber of policy issues that must be considered in order to achieve sustainability in the
Russian forest sector.
Barbara Lehmbruch’s contribution, Ministerial Spin-Offs and Economic Transformation
in the Russian Timber Industry, 1992-1996, deals with new sectoral governance patterns
5emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Focus of the analysis is what Lembruch
calls “ministerial spin-offs”: new timber industry entities created after 1992 with former
ministerial staff and resources and often based on broad regional membership. The
emergence of such patterns of interorganizational relationships can be explained by
weaknesses in the macroinstitutions, such as the legal and regulatory system. Given un-
even implementation, collective action of any sort thus becomes largely futile and is re-
placed by particularistic strategies. This, Lembruch concludes, is not a transitional
problem, bound to disappear as new post-Soviet institutional arrangements and resource
distribution patterns stabilize. Rather, it is firmly rooted in institutional weaknesses that
go back to Soviet-style socialism and its disregard for rational procedure.
While Malmlöf’s study is performed on a rather general level and Lehmbruch deals
with the central industrial branch level, the focus of Olga Mashkina’s contribution,
Measuring Attitudinal Diversity through Q-analysis – an Illustration of a Research Ap-
proach, is the individual manager and policy maker. Mashkina makes the assumption
that a transformation of the Russian forest sector goes alongside with attitudinal change.
By using a limited set of data she suggests and also demonstrates how Q-analysis could
be used for further investigations concerning individual attitudes related to the restruc-
turing of the Russian forest sector. Through the use of the methodology she extracts two
possible profiles among Siberian policy makers. Members of the first tentative group,
the “Demand Accusers” are unified by a tendency to blame the general lack of demand
of timber for the shortcomings in the forest sector. The members of this group also em-
phasize the necessity of governmental demand.
The members of another group, the “Realistic Entrepreneurs,” believe that most prob-
lems are due to a number of rather common business variables, such as the availability
of financial resources and entrepreneurial behavior. Aware of the fact that the material
is rather small, Mashkina hypothesizes that the differences in attitudes can be attributed
to regional circumstances, such as industrial profile, etc. The conclusion is that this form
of analysis may contribute significantly to the understanding of the transformation of
the Russian forest sector.
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Due to environmental factors, its sheer size and low population density, Russia is en-
dowed with abundant forest resources. With a forested area of 764 million hectares, or
45% of the territory, it is the biggest forest holder in the world. In fact, Russian forests
make up no less than 22% of the forests of the whole planet (World Bank, 1997). This
circumstance has always played an important role in the design of the forest manage-
ment and forest use in Russia.
Compared to other European countries, a property rights system of open access pre-
vailed much longer in Russia, as there was no awareness of forests as a limited resource.
During the 19th century, there was a sharp increase in the demand for wood as a conse-
quence of the development of the physical infrastructure. Steamers and steam engines
consumed huge amounts of fuel wood, and the construction of the railway net required
wood as construction material, etc. The first factories that were established during this
period used wood as their source of energy and owing to the improved communications
they were not dependent on local timber but could buy it from far away. All this led to a
local scarcity of timber in several places in the Russian heartland. This in turn resulted
in a rise in prices on local markets (Filonenko, 1993).
At the end of the 19th century, the deforestation of European Russia had gone so far that
it began to have a severe impact on the river systems and on the climate. Without the
protecting forests, the microclimate in several places in central Russia was destroyed.
Chilly winds from the north devastated orchards and cultivations. Due to decreasing
water levels, the main rivers used for transportation became unnavigable during sum-
mertime as a result of the vanished system of waterholding forests along the riverbanks
(Filonenko, 1993).
It seems that most of these problems were taken into consideration in the modern forest
management system that developed after the Second World War. For instance, areas
that were over-harvested during the 19th century or devastated during the war were later
subjected to special measures and harvesting methods in that they were transferred to a
8special management group. Forest resources that were open for exploitation were care-
fully examined, and sensitive sub-areas were excluded from final harvesting.
A significant part of the Russian forest resources is found in remote areas, which makes
it difficult to exploit them. During the course of Russian history, there has been a ten-
dency to move the forest industry to the east, but now it seems that this development has
been halted. With increased transportation costs exploitation in some areas in Siberia
has become directly unprofitable. Russia’s factual forest resources are thereby substan-
tially less than what might be indicated by the volume of the State Forest Fund1. Two
parallel lines of development are noticeable. First, it has become more important than
ever that the commercial forests are managed in a way that allows a future exploitation.
Second, the pressure to harvest in exploitable but sensitive or protected areas is rising.
In 1988, the forest industry contributed 5% of total industrial production in the Soviet
Union2. Since then, however, the output of forest products has dramatically declined,
especially after 1992.
Table 1: Output of Forest Products in Russia in 1988 and 1995.
Russia
Product Unit 1988 1995 1995/1988
Wood mln. m3 354.0 115.0 32.5%
Sawn wood mln. m3 84.0 27.0 32.1%
Plywood mln. m3 1.7 0.9 52.9%
Particle board mln. m3 5.5 2.2 40.0%
Fiberboard mln. m3 1.6 0.7 43.8%
Wood pulp mln. ton 10.4 5.4 51.9%
Cellulose mln. ton 7.2* 4.2 58.7%
Paper mln. ton 5.3 2.8 52.8%
Cardboard mln. ton 3.2 1.3 40.6%
* The data for Cellulose in 1988 is extrapolated as an average of the production data for 1980 and 1990.
Source: The State Statistical Committee of Russia, based on World Bank 1997, p.189.
The production fall in the Russian forest sector may be traced back to two main causes.
The first one is related to the special preconditions of Soviet statistics. The behavior of
workers and managers was guided by a production plan. As monitoring of the accuracy
of statistics became less rigid over the years, and while the incentives to distort data
                                                
1
  In Russian terminology the State Forest Fund stands for Government-owned forest and non-forest lands
that are managed by the authorised forest management agencies, primarily by the Federal Forest Service
in Russia (World Bank, 1997).
2
  Most of the timber industry was located in the RFSSR, i. e. on the territory that presently makes up the
Russian Federation. Therefore, all other parameters the same, one may assume that the forest industry
output in Soviet Union in 1988 and in the Russian Federation in 1992 are roughly comparable with each
other.
9prevailed3, statistics became more and more unreliable. However, the whole decline can
not be explained as a result of unreliable statistics. The second cause for the production
fall in the forest sector is the receding domestic demand. For example, construction ac-
tivities declined by 43% between 1990 and 1993, and new housing construction fell by
32%. Consumption of paper and paperboard declined to 14 kilograms per person, one of
the lowest rates in the developed world (World Bank, 1997).
As somewhat of a contrast, exports seem to have recovered fairly well from the decline
during the first years of transition. Exports of wood products have constituted a sub-
stantial portion of total output and have been a significant source of foreign currency
earnings. Logs, the main export product, are shipped to 40 countries, while lumber, pulp
and paper, and furniture products are shipped to some 70 countries. Reported export
earnings fell sharply between 1990 and 1992, from $3.87 billion to $1.49 billion, with
the adjustments in the foreign exchange rate accounting for most of the decline in export
earnings (World Bank, 1997). Since then, there has been a recovery and even some
growth in timber export volumes. In 1995, the total value of forestry product exports
had risen to $4.2 billion, which is partly a result of the growth in export volumes, and
partly a result of doubled world market prices. Even without an increase in export vol-
umes or rising world market prices, a further increase in export incomes is to be ex-
pected as the Government deliberately tries to increase the share of high value added
wood products in exports at the expense of roundwood and sawnwood. One question of
concern, however, is the soaring transportation costs. Transport in Russia is currently
economically viable for a distance of up to about 1,000 km for logs, and 2,500 km for
sawnwood, while the distances from many wood supply areas to the nearest seaport ex-
ceed 5,000 km (World Bank, 1997).
A general impression given both in western and Russian sources is that the forest sector
since long lacks adequate funding, which hurts the domestic sector as well as the for-
eign sector. Sawmills, as well as pulp and paper mills are in a poor state and are facing
serious difficulties. In sawmills Russian frame saw lines without any higher accuracy
are used. As kiln-drying facilities are often unavailable, most sawnwood is shipped
green or incompletely air-dried. Usually it is delivered unsorted as well. In the pulp and
paper industry, 65% of the machinery and equipment is old and badly worn out. The
industry has caused severe environmental damage, and most of the sulfite pulp mills
have been closed or are forced to operate at severely reduced production levels (World
Bank, 1997).
Thus, it can be concluded that the Russian forest sector has a greater potential than what
is indicated by current production volumes. An increase in output for the domestic mar-
ket is highly dependent on the general economic performance of Russia. Considering an
expansion on foreign markets, one has to allow for the high transportation costs and the
poor quality of the processed timber.
                                                
3
  Reporting a slight overfulfillment of the plan provided, for example, a bonus payment. The impact of
this factor has not been controlled for in the data given. Therefore, the indicators for 1988 may have been
exaggerated to a certain extent.
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The Social Functions of the Russian Forest Sector
During the Soviet period the state-owned enterprises had to take on a social responsibil-
ity for all their workers and other people affected by their activities, which is unthink-
able in a market context. Almost as a rule, enterprises were obliged to answer for hous-
ing, the building and operation of day-care centers, schools, community centers, shops,
homes for old people, and so on. As logging in Russia mostly occurs in remote areas
with very few other activities around, this tendency became very strong in the forestry
sector.
One very important task in the ongoing restructuring process of the Russian economy is
to transfer the social infrastructure to local or federal authorities. The enterprises are
often more than happy to get rid of their social obligations, but due to the weak financial
position of local authorities, the latter are quite reluctant to shoulder the burden. This
means that significant groups of the Russian population today live in a social limbo, a
gray-zone that is managed neither by the enterprises, nor by the local authorities. In a
forestry context, there are especially three groups that are affected by the development:
the aboriginal peoples, the indigenous peoples, and the workers in the forestry sector.
There are some 190,000 people in Russia who consider themselves as members of abo-
riginal groups (World Bank, 1997). The term aboriginal group refers to the first settlers
in the northern and eastern parts of Russia. These groups are engaged largely in subsis-
tence fishing, hunting, and reindeer herding, and since the 1920s they have enjoyed
certain privileges.4 Usually the aboriginal peoples view their way of life as the only
means of survival for a culture distinct from the larger, multiethnic community.
The so-called indigenous groups arrived after the aboriginal peoples.5 These groups
consider semi-traditional occupations like hunting and fishing as an essential part of
their cultural heritage, but unlike the aboriginal peoples they do not view modern prac-
tices or occupations and assimilation into modern society as threats to their cultural
identity (World Bank, 1997).
The threats that these groups now face come from two sides. Declining wage incomes
and employment rate in the forestry, mining, oil and gas sectors force newcomers and
workers in these sectors to rely increasingly on wildlife resources for their livelihood.
This means that the demand for forest and non-timber resources has increased, thereby
exposing the aboriginal and indigenous peoples to a higher degree of competition than
before (World Bank, 1997).
The second threat originates from the land use of various industrial enterprises. Land is
being spoilt or destroyed by ecologically improper management of certain enterprises or
because the land use pattern of the enterprises upsets the established patterns of land
allocation agreed upon among the local population prior to the creation of the enterprise.
However, few aboriginal or indigenous groups protest against the misuse of land. As is
the case in the forest sector, the logging enterprises provide these groups with badly
needed jobs, transport links to district centers, and they supply goods for local shops.
                                                
4
  Aboriginal groups are also known as “small-in-number peoples of the North,” and were classified as
“primitive and underdeveloped” under the establishment of the Soviet Union.
5
  Khakas, Yakuts and Russian “old settlers” are usually considered as indigenous groups. The indigenous
status makes a group eligible for free hunting and fishing licenses and land allocation free of rent or tax.
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The pattern can be recognized in other parts of the world where aboriginal peoples have
to face the challenge of the encounter with the developed world (World Bank, 1997).
The workers in the forest industry have also been severely hit by the reconstruction of
the Russian economy. In the former Soviet Union, forests provided employment to more
than 7% of the country’s workforce and directly affected the lives of around 10 million
people, of which some 18% lived in remote logging communities (World Bank, 1997;
Blandon, 1983). The impact of transition on these forest communities has been severe.
In the past these communities relied on heavy government subsidies in order to provide
transportation, food, and salary premiums for qualified health and education profession-
als, for instance. Their isolation and low population density now raise the cost of pro-
viding social services, and with the phasing out of subsidies, many of these remote
communities have been left even more isolated from the outside world, and lack basic
supplies and services. The inhabitants often find themselves to be in a hopeless situa-
tion: on the one hand life in the logging community has become insupportable, on the
other, they are unable to move as their working skills and experiences are of no use
anywhere else.
As was stated before, the local authorities are now taking over the responsibility for the
social infrastructure from the timber companies. This process is becoming even more
difficult due to the fact that forest enterprises are often so-called gradoobrazuiushchie
predpriiatia, or city-building enterprises, around which the whole local society initially
was created. In fact, it was the foundation of the enterprise that gave the local society an
economic reason to exist. In theory, the local administrations are supposed to finance
the provided services at least in part through payroll taxes collected from enterprises.
Unfortunately, in many of the remote communities where forest enterprises are located,
enterprises have had to shut down operations or are operating at a loss and so are unable
to pay salaries to their employees or taxes to local administrations. As a rule, there are
no other strong tax payers from which to collect taxes.
To sum up, the economies of the aboriginal and indigenous peoples are highly depend-
ent on the Russian forests. The forest industry itself is in a poor state, and it is doubtful
that it can deliver value added wood products that meet international demands for qual-
ity. Harvesting patterns also show that the more valuable coniferous forests are over-
utilized, which means that ecological sustainability is at risk (Blandon, 1983; Barr &
Braden, 1988; World Bank, 1997). Especially the aboriginal peoples see every threat to
the forests as a threat against themselves and their cultural identity. On the other hand,
these groups cannot live without forest exploitation either. Forest enterprises, as well as
oil and mining companies bring with them badly needed work opportunities that will
make the income last longer and, in addition, they also bring some of the infrastructure
of a modern society.
The workers in the forest sector are even more affected by the actual fall in production.
The logging communities have been hit the hardest, but the depression has also caused
serious drawbacks to workers of sawmills and pulp and paper industries. Unemploy-
ment, wage arrears, deterioration of the physical and economic infrastructure is the price
workers in the forest sector have had to pay for the years of transition.
In short, Russian authorities have a very delicate task in setting policy goals for the re-
born Russian State. They have to guarantee ecological and economic sustainability and
simultaneously balance the different interests of affected social groups against each
other. At the same time the forest sector has to carry some of the burdens from the past.
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The sector is still affected by an organizational pattern that was developed many hun-
dred years ago, i.e., long before the establishment of the Soviet Union.
Russian Forest Management, a Historical Overview
The purpose of this historical overview of the Russian forest sector is to give an idea of
the general pattern of development and how this process might influence the present day
forest sector. The section is divided into three main blocks, covering the czarist, com-
munist, and the post-communist periods of Russian history.
The Forest Management System in Czarist Russia
During the European Middle Ages there was no awareness of forests being a limited
resource in the way that we understand it today. However, in most countries a property
rights system developed that protected the forests of the Crown and of the landlords.
The peasants were usually obliged to use forests that no one else claimed as theirs, and
as most of them lived together in villages, different kinds of common property systems
developed among them.
An enforced property rights system embracing the forests in Russia emerged much later.
Here peasants, landlords and the Crown alike harvested timber where it was most con-
venient at the moment – no matter who was the formal owner. (Filonenko, 1993: 15).
Actually, the existing mix of private and state forest property turned into a de facto open
access system, the only constraint on which seems to have been the technical equipment
used for felling and transportation.
Under Peter the Great, attempts were made to enforce property rights. Czar Peter
wanted to challenge the growing military powers in Europe and needed to strengthen
and renew Russia’s armed forces. As a part of this belligerent agenda, the Russian Navy
was founded in 1696, and now the forests suddenly turned into a resource of strategic
importance for an expanding state power (Filonenko, 1993). Already in 1698 Peter con-
ferred upon the Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds to look after the preservation
of forests and, wherever possible, to plant all sorts of useful “things” (Filonenko, 1993:
17). Later, in 1703, Peter promulgated the first forest ukaz of national significance. Ac-
cording to this decree, forest lands at a distance less than 50 verst from big rivers and
less than 20 verst from small rivers received the status of nature reserve.6 Logging ac-
tivities in these areas became strictly regulated. Oak was to be cut only if it was needed
for ship construction, and offenders of this rule were faced with the death penalty. Later
the punishment for unauthorized oak cutting was changed to flogging, the cutting of
one’s nose and imprisonment with hard labor. Logging of other species was regulated
according to the tree diameter and those not following these rules were fined. However,
even under this regime, lime-trees could be harvested without any limitations, probably
because they were assumed to be of no commercial or strategic value (Filonenko, 1993).
Altogether, Peter the Great was to issue more than 200 forest ukazy during his time as
czar of Russia. However, as more than six million hectares of forests disappeared under
Peter’s reign, it follows that the rules were not effectively implemented, in spite of the
                                                
6
  One verst corresponds to 1066.8 m., which means that the outer borders of Peter’s natural reserves were
situated about 21.3 km and 53.3 km from small and big rivers respectively.
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harsh punishments of offenders (Filonenko, 1993). None the less, Peter founded a man-
agement system that in its mature form survived well into the first decade after the
revolution in 1917. In 1718, he ordered the governor in Kazan to set up a forest inspec-
tion, and within a year, all gubernias had followed Kazan. This organization was the
embryo of the German-inspired Russian Forest Department, which was created in 1798
by Czar Pavel I (Borbov, 1997). Under the supremacy of the Russian Forest Depart-
ment, the forests were managed by provincial forest departments, which in turn were
divided into forest management units (Sheingauz et al., 1995: 1). From its foundation
until 1811 the Forest Department fell under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and con-
sequently, its first two directors were former Admirals and even war heroes. (Borbov,
1997). In the light of the strategic importance of the forests for the Navy, this can be of
no surprise. In 1811, the Forest Department was reorganized as the Forest Division in
the Department of State Property under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance (Bor-
bov, 1997).
However, with the death of Peter the Great, his ukazy lost their legal force. As his suc-
cessors on the Russian throne in general paid much less attention to the forest sector, it
retarded into the old system of open access. Local scarcity of timber caused a significant
price variation between different regions of Russia. Probably in order to derive advan-
tages from the situation, local landlords tried to claim their property rights by introduc-
ing a payment for logged timber. However, since it was forbidden to charge for the tim-
ber itself, they had the appropriators pay for the number of axes used. The normal
charge was from twenty copeks to one rouble per axe, whereby the appropriator got free
access to the forest for a period of one year (Filonenko, 1993).
During the 19th century, with the development of new physical infrastructure, the de-
mand for timber reached such levels that it began to have a severe impact on the climate
and river systems in the central parts of Russia. It soon became clear that the prevailing
open access system was unsustainable, and that the situation had to be solved on a
macro level. At the same time forest science gradually gained influence and esteem in
the eyes of society. Special forest exhibitions were held, and among these one organized
in 1885 at the Manege square in the very center of Moscow is considered to have been
one of the most important “forest events” at the time. The theme of this exhibition was
forest management; its exhibits came from 16 different counties, and 9,600 paying
visitors attended it. One of the practical results of the event was that some counties
started to organize special “holidays” for schoolchildren to help with tree plantation.
In 1894, the Russian minister of agriculture, Aleksey Sergeevich Yermolov, initiated the
“Survey Expedition of the Springs of the Main Rivers in European Russia.” The pur-
pose of the expedition was to chart the connection between the river system of the Rus-
sian heartland and the surrounding forests, whereby a new forest policy could be devel-
oped on scientific grounds (Filonenko, 1993: 75). The staff members of the expedition
were the most distinguished scientists in Russia representing a wide spectrum of differ-
ent scientific disciplines. They set about their work in all seriousness, but it was not un-
til 12 years later, in 1908, that the five volumes of the conclusions of the expedition
were ready for publishing (Filonenko, 1993: 129). However, in the meantime ad hoc
recommendations, concerning felling practices, reforestation and so on, were issued.
Probably under the influence of the expedition, the first Russian forest tax was imposed
in 1898. Henceforth logging companies harvesting state forests were either charged to
reforest the area cut, or to pay to the Crown the estimated costs for reforestation.
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The significance of this law could best be evaluated by looking at the situation before
and after it gained legal force. In the 20-year period before the October Revolution,
more than 700,000 hectares were artificially reforested after logging, which should be
compared to those 180,000 hectares which had been reforested during the previous 200
years. However, during this 20-year period, more than 10 million hectares were har-
vested, which also should be compared to the 58 million hectares that were logged dur-
ing the same earlier period of 200 years (Filonenko, 1993: 118).
The Beginnings of the Soviet Forest Management System
According to the pre-revolutionary agenda of the Communists, forests were to be trans-
ferred to the poor and needy in analogy with the transfer of agricultural land to the peas-
ants and the factories to the workers. However, the redistribution of forests never be-
came a popular catchphrase although it sometimes appeared in newspaper articles. A
probable reason for this was that not much had changed in practice, i.e., the system of
“rules-in-use” (Ostrom et al., 1993) regulating the forest sector since Medieval ages
prevailed, no matter what kind of laws had been adopted or how severe the punishment
of offenders had been. Usually, “a half-quarter of vodka to the forester could settle most
problems,” and as no political party wins sympathy by promoting a system that is al-
ready in use, the Communists did not emphasize this question before the revolution
(Filonenko, 1993: 138).
After the revolution in 1917, Lenin seems to have been among those revolutionaries that
understood the necessity of establishing some kind of modus vivendi with the intelli-
gentsia and different experts of the old regime – at least for a transitional period 7. A
general dismissal of foresters and forest experts would not have been of any use to the
forest sector, and the local Soviets were informed that “it was impossible to exchange
forestry experts for others without causing great harm to the forests, and, therefore to
the Soviet people itself.” Forestry was considered to be a sector that no one could enter
without having “special technical knowledge” (Filonenko, 1993: 141).
However, these statements were not followed by any practical change of the prevailing
property rights regime, and therefore the uneasy alliance between the forest experts and
the new authorities did not last for long. All forests were “transferred” to the people
through expropriation and nationalization, whereby the old habit of de facto open access
just continued.8 Individuals logged for fuel and the nationalized timber companies
logged in order to fulfill the goals set in the first five-year plan that was adopted by the
Communist Party in 1928. At the same time, foresters and forest managers of the “old
school” struggled to save as much as possible of the sustainable forestry management
                                                
7
  It is significant that the Bolsheviks after the revolution tried to come to terms with army officers, engi-
neers, physicians, scientists and other groups who filled important functions in society. In order to keep
their positions, only some kind of declaration of loyalty towards the new regime was required. Many
communists distrusted this development as they felt that this heavy reliance on experts from the old re-
gime betrayed the revolution. With NEP the Bolsheviks even gave away their economic initiative,
whereby the only way to restore the Party’s leading role in society, and once and for all crush all inde-
pendent elite, was through the purges that Stalin initiated during the 1930s. See for instance Kaminski
(1992).
8
  The first forest law of the Soviet Union was the Forest Decree of 1918, which declared all forests to be
common national property. Between 1923 and 1925 the republics of the Soviet Union adopted their own
forest codes (Sheingauz et al. 1995, p. 1).
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system that had gradually developed during the last decades. What they did in fact was
to strive for the implementation of scientifically founded recommendations and to influ-
ence forest policies by issuing warnings about the critical state of the Russian forests.
However, the conventional wisdom was that “the foresters as former Czarist civil ser-
vants did not allow the representatives of the working people to fell timber where they
wanted to” (Borbov, 1997). The situation was unstable, and the Government had to
choose which leg it should stand on. It chose to break with the forest experts.
The great attack on the Russian forest science began in 1929. One of the executive man-
agers of the National Board of Forestry, M. G. Zdornik, was allowed to set the agenda
for the future forest management: “As long as we need forests we will harvest them in
accordance with our needs without any theoretical discussions; we can not stop this at-
tack on the forests” (Filonenko, 1993: 144). At the same time this statement was issued,
the achievements of the forest science during the 19th century was called into question.
In the communist terminology, a “forest front” was opened in the on-going struggle for
power between the different social classes.9 In short, forest experts of the “old school”
were accused of being reactionaries and of giving shelter to bourgeois thinking by
stressing the importance of continuous forest management. According to the Commu-
nists, the regeneration argument only applied to a past era in the Russian history. Who
was to profit from a continuous forest management if landlords and forest owners no
longer existed as a social class? The goal of these groups had been to achieve a lifelong,
continuous yield, which was of little use in a society officially made up of only workers
and peasants, ruled by a regime that, in the name of the people, had nationalized all for-
ests and which called itself the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Thus, without any landlords and forest owners, the only production parameter that had
to be considered in the Soviet Union was the available transport capacity. Besides fitting
into the common Russian apprehension of Russian forests as being inexhaustible, this
conception also fits into a more general ideological framework of marxist-leninist
thinking, where man is supposed to be involved in a perpetual struggle with the ele-
mental forces. The purpose of the battle is that, submitted to the will of man, nature
should be conquered, forced to reveal its secrets.10
In the late 1920s, the management system inherited from the Czars went through its first
changes. Regional forest codes were declared obsolete, and from this time until 1977,
when the Soviet Union got its first Forest Code, forest management was practiced with-
out any special forestry laws. Instead there were resolutions of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Republics’ councils of
Ministers, as well as regulations issued by individual departments within the admini-
stration.11 Not even the pre-revolutionary forestry management organization pleased the
                                                
9
  Contrary to Marxist thinking, Stalin was of the opinion that the class struggle would intensify after the
revolution when the bourgeoisie realised that they were in fact losing ground. This opinion was of course
very convenient when the system of “democratic centralism” should be implemented, as it made up the
logic fundament of the show-trials and the purges of oppositionary Communists and the old intelligentsia
during the 1930s.
10
  Compare, for instance, with Khruschev’s attempt to grow cotton in the Central Asian republics with
their low rainfall or the discussions during the 70s to change the direction of the Siberian rivers from
south-north to north-south.
11
  The extent of the centralization of the forest policies is indicated by the level where resolutions were
taken. Of a total of 65 documents 60 were approved at the Union level and only 5 at the republic level
(Sheingauz et al. 1995, p. 1).
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communists. The organization was split up, and the responsibility for forest manage-
ment was distributed among several different departments on an all-union as well as on
a sub-union level. However, in 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolu-
tion, which again resulted in a unified forest management system for the whole Soviet
Union (Sheingauz et al., 1995: 1).
Forest Management after 1947
The decision to split up the responsibility of forest management among different
authorities may be interpreted as an attempt to destroy the old system, to weaken the
positions of foresters and forest experts, while at the same time strengthen the centralist
system of government. By analogy, the reconstruction of the forest management might
be seen as a restoration of the old system, but with one important exception: This time,
the recreated forest management system was a “tamed” organization, an obedient tool
that was to implement orders from above instead of devoting its time to critical thinking
of its own.
However, the reestablishment of a unified forest management system may even be in-
terpreted as a rehabilitation of the old school, the recognition of “bourgeois forest sci-
ence” as a fundament for forest management. This was a pragmatic adjustment to the
new post-war reality: Among all countries fighting in the Second World War, the Soviet
Union no doubt paid the highest price in terms of human lives and material devastation.
The need for housing and repair of old houses was acute, and the demand for timber as a
construction material reached new levels. At the same time, as a result of warfare, local
forests in the western parts of the Soviet Union were in a miserable condition – if they
had survived the war at all. In such a situation, there was no longer any use for a utopian
“socialist forest science school.” From now on, even socialists had to follow the main-
stream of forest science.
For the purpose of securing future timber production and restore devastated “green
shields” along roads and water bodies, tree plantation was introduced on a greater scale
than before. With a minimum of bureaucracy, people who volunteered for tree-
plantation could get fire-wood and timber for repair straight from the local forest
authorities without any interference from other authorities (Filonenko, 1993: 197).12
This system of payment in kind seems to have been rather successful, as both the forest
service and the rural population benefited from it. Usually, hay was provided in ex-
change for help with tree plantation. In order to get access to fresh milk products and
fresh meat, which were scarcities in most shops, many dwellers in the countryside kept
private cattle even after the collectivization and dekulakisation during the 1930s. The
fodder needed for feeding cattle was supplied from the forest authorities while a
“planter” was guaranteed hay harvested from an area as big as the one he had planted
with trees (Filonenko, 1993: 203)13. In this way, local dwellers learned to know their
forests, and they even knew which of their neighbors had planted a specific area. One
may even presume that through their involvement in the forest management people were
                                                
12
  Usually, requisitions for fire-wood, timber and forage for privately held cattle had to pass through the
Oblispolkom, the Regional Executive Committee.
13
  The alternative to legally obtaining forage from the forest authorities was to steal it from the kolkhoze
where one usually worked.
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prepared to take on a greater responsibility for their local forests. Thus, they got a better
understanding for the mechanisms ruling the health of a forest ecological system.
Soviet Forest Management under Khrushchev and His Successors
In 1961, the system of tree planters working for payment in kind ended as a side effect
of circumstances external to the forest management system. As an attempt to raise food
production at the country’s sovkhozes and kolkhozes, Khrushchev “dekulakisized” the
countryside a second time in that he forbade privately held cattle. However, the reform
did not succeed, and what was worse for the forest sector, the rural population had lost
its incentive to participate in any further tree plantations. From then on plantations had
to be carried out by hired workers (Filonenko, 1993).
During his time in power, Khrushchev also carried out experiments with a decentralized
government. With the exception of the most vital ministries dealing with nuclear engi-
neering and armaments, all other industrial ministries were abolished in 1957. The All-
Union Gosplan and the union-republican Gosplans together with the new – for this pur-
pose specially founded sovnarkhozy, or regional economic councils – became the new
executives with the duties of the former ministries divided between them (Brown et al.,
1994: 395). The main purpose of the reform – a better overview of the planning process
as a basis for better planning – was not obtained, which eventually resulted in the re-
centralization process that began in 1962 (Brown et al., 1994).
Khruschev’s organizational reforms did not survive his ousting in 1964. The re-
establishment of the centralist order in forestry management meant that even more deci-
sions from here on were to be made by central bureaucrats. As an example, foresters
were now deprived of their rights to allow willing local settlers to log certain trees for
household requirements as a part of sanitary cutting or thinning (Filonenko, 1993). It is
possible that this development increased the transparency of the forestry system for
central planners and policy-makers, but at the same time it was a further step away from
a system where local and specific circumstances could be taken into consideration in the
daily management.
The Soviet Union reached its “mature” form in the beginning of the 1970s. Essentially,
from this time and henceforward three types of parties interested in the Russian forests
can be identified: the first type is concerned with the management of forest production,
the second with production of forestry products, and the third with forestry management
and environmental protection.
In 1977, the Soviet Union established its first Forest Code, finally making it possible to
deal with the forest management system as a whole. In principle, the law did not entail
any fundamental changes for the management practices that had evolved over time as a
consequence of normative resolutions. In short, the administrative structure of the forest
legislation was divided into a legislative, a general executive and a department level.
The USSR Supreme Soviet together with the soviets of the republics were in charge of
all legislative actions, whereby general executive actions were implemented by the
USSR Council of Ministers, the Union and Autonomous Republics as well as by the
provincial and municipal executive committees. Actions were usually carried out by dif-
ferent departments, both at the union level and at its sub-levels (Sheingauz et al., 1995:
2-3).
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According to Sheingauz et al., the Forest Code from 1977 had some major flaws that
made it incomplete and inefficient as a guideline and a tool for an effective and sustain-
able forest management. The first imperfection was that the Code did not provide for a
mechanism by which the legislative decisions made by executive and departmental
authorities could be implemented. Even if this was the most significant shortcoming of
the Code, it was not the only one (Sheingauz et al., 1995).
A second drawback had to do with the hierarchical top-down order that affected the for-
est sector. In practice, it turned out to be difficult to bring about the co-ordination be-
tween the legislative, general executive, and department levels that the Code presup-
posed. Those in the upper levels of the system were ignorant of local forest specifics,
principally as a result of lack of information about and understanding of these condi-
tions. What made matters worse was, that the Communist Party from time to time inter-
vened in the system, in order to guarantee production output at any cost. This, in turn,
resulted in “a depletion of forest resources and the neglect of environmental impacts”
(Sheingauz et al., 1995).
A third problem was the exaggerated role that subsequent, departmental regulations
came to play within the framework of the Forest Code. As stated above, the responsi-
bilities of the executive authorities were thoroughly defined from the USSR Council of
Ministers down to the local Soviets. Since the provincial level in many cases did not
have any executive authorities; different departmental organs often took over the re-
sponsibilities that was reserved for the executive authorities. Thereby, the departmental
authorities came to take decisions for which they were not qualified (Sheingauz et al.,
1995).
The Forest Management System in Post-Communist Russia
The break-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the new Russian constitution in 1993,
and the continuous move towards a market economy have brought radical political, le-
gal and economic changes that have shaken all sectors of the economy, including the
forest sector. As stated above, some of the results of these dramatic changes have been a
general production decline and social hardship for different population strata in the Rus-
sian Federation. The old production concepts of the central planning system have be-
come obsolete, unsustainable and non-functioning. The forest sector, particularly the
remote logging communities of Siberia and in the Far East, have had to face significant
economic drawbacks and accompanying social problems.
Russian authorities in the forest sector have tried to overcome the disadvantages affect-
ing the sector by phasing in new legal concepts concerning management and utilization.
To provide interim ground rules for forest management and utilization, the “Principles
of Forest Legislation of the Russian Federation” were enacted by the Parliament and
signed into law in March 1993 to replace the old Forest Code.
Although the interim Principles were generally in line with current international, social,
economic, and environmental thinking about sustainable forest development, in crucial
parts they lacked in specificity. “The wording in the 1993 law is a mixture of old propo-
sitions and passages taken directly from the 1970s law” (Sheingauz et al., 1995: 9). As
forest utilization in the wording of the law only referred to forest harvesting, many of
the non-wood functions were not considered at all. In administrative and fiscal proc-
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esses the principles vested many interested parties with control over forest resources
without properly defining their responsibilities (Sheingauz et al., 1995).
The adoption of a new permanent forest code has not been an easy task. Work on draft-
ing the new code began already in 1994, but as subsequent major changes in other
branches of the legal framework – such as changes in the Civil Code or new environ-
mental laws – were made at the same time, the new Forest Code was significantly de-
layed. Another major obstacle has been the lack of consensus on other legal issues. Un-
der the interim Principles, some subjects of the Russian Federation14; the republics of
Karelia, Udmurtia, Bashkortostan, and Leningradskaia oblast’ for instance, managed to
pass their own forest laws (Kostyok, 1997). Unfortunately, these regional codes were
often inconsistent with federal laws. Especially in those cases when they declared that
forests were the property of the actual federal subject, they created tension between the
center and the periphery. As a matter of fact, the new Forest Code now in force was
passed by the Duma already in the summer of 1996, but as it contains a provision de-
claring all forests of the State Forest Fund to be federal property, the Federal Council,
where all the leaders of the federative subjects are seated, rejected the Duma’s draft for
its non-compliance with the Constitution and environmental legislation. In short, the
new proposed Forest Code became another issue in the ongoing struggle for power be-
tween Moscow and the subjects of the Russian Federation, and it was not until the
spring of 1997 that the new Forest Code finally could be signed into law.
Constitutional Rules Affecting the Forest Sector
The historic overview above has shown how the Russian forestry system has worked
under different types of political and economic regimes. Under Peter the Great a mer-
cantilist system developed in that the Crown formulated rules based on its own strategic
interests. Among other policies, forests situated close to waterways became more or less
confiscated and subjugated to detailed harvesting and management rules. The system
was very centralized, and, under the threat of severe punishment, firms and individuals
were obliged to serve the interests of the Crown. At least in theory, the Crown had a
monopoly in setting the collective choice rules and the operational rules. However, the
severe punishments show that the state’s ability to enforce its rules probably was lim-
ited. The state did not have information about all activities on its territory, and it could
therefore just hope that a few severely punished offenders would work as a warning to
others. As this implementation strategy is quite unreliable, one may expect that local
rules-in-use not sanctioned by the Crown nevertheless developed. A further indication
that this in fact was the case, are the above-mentioned six million hectares of forests that
disappeared under the reign of Peter the Great alone.
In the capitalist system that gradually developed in pre-revolutionary Russia, the state
had to accept private property rights, thereby also accepting other actors on the scene.
Consequently, the Crown had to rely upon more subtle ways of governing. Instead of
brute force, tax regulations and information campaigns became more commonly used
tools for governing.
                                                
14
  According to the constitution, there are 89 subjects in the Russian Federation, divided into republics,
oblasts, krays and autonomous okrugs depending on their size, population, political significance, ethnicity
and historical circumstances.
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Under socialist rule, the forest sector became re-centralized. All forests and all forest
enterprises were nationalized in the name of the people, and – as Valery Shubin, the di-
rector of the Federal Forest Service of the Russian Federation (Federal’naia Sluzhba
Lesnogo Khoziastva), puts it – no one questioned the directives that came from the cen-
ter but interpreted them as laws (Kostyok, 1997: 22).
Today, according to Shubin, there still exists a very broad consensus that forests should
remain state property (Kostyok, 1997). What has been questioned is the distribution of
responsibility between the federation and its subjects. In the new Forest Code, forests
are declared to be federal property, but with part of the management responsibility dele-
gated to the federal subjects. In principle, Moscow decides the harvesting volumes in
order to prevent river sources from being deforested or reproduction areas from being
devastated. The federal subject, in turn, decides who may harvest the forest. Moscow’s
concern for the low stumpage fees has also been taken into consideration in the new
Forest Code. In order to prevent the emergence of special interests or corruption, Mos-
cow decides the minimal stumpage fees, which have to be paid to the federation. If a
foreign firm wants to achieve concession rights, the federal subject can not arbitrarily
make a decision on this matter (Kostyok, 1997).
Collective Choice in the Forest Sector
The historic overview also showed that before Peter the Great, collective choice rules in
the form of forest policies were poorly developed. The only forest policy that was in use
for centuries in the sparsely populated Russia was that everyone could fell timber every-
where no matter to whom the forest belonged (Filonenko, 1993).
Peter the Great monopolized the right to issue collective choice rules. Under his reign,
forest policy was based on the security interests of the state, whereby, as stated above,
tree species were protected or harvested according to their usefulness for the Russian
military in general, and for the Russian fleet in particular.
The Czars after Peter the Great did not take any genuine interest in the forest sector.
Initiatives for a more sophisticated forest policy came from the landlords who had an
economic incentive to claim their property rights by limiting access to privately owned
forests. It was not until deforestation began to have a severe impact on the climate, thus
causing great harm to people’s living conditions that the state again interfered in a more
resolute manner. This time, the state tried to anchor its forest policy in a scientific per-
spective. Forest science gained in esteem and played a crucial role in formulating a
policy of sustainable forest management.
The first years after the revolution were as chaotic to the forest sector as to other
branches of the Russian economy. Forest experts no longer had any legal ground to is-
sue policy recommendations or to implement them. At the same time, Lenin recognized
their importance and protected them against the more radical elements of the first
Communist leadership. The end of NEP nevertheless meant the end for the forestry ex-
perts’ efforts to achieve a sustainable forest management. According to the new forest
policy, only economic and logistic parameters had to be considered.
After the Second World War, forest science again gained in esteem, but now it had been
fully incorporated into the state organs and completely lost its independence. Neverthe-
less, the balance between economic and environmental demands were in some respects
restored and better considered in the production plans than before the war.
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With respect to policy issues, the historic overview finally showed that not much has
changed in the Russian forestry management system since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Moscow keeps its initiative in policy questions according to the power-sharing scheme
outlined in the Forest Code in force. The federal subjects, in turn, are reduced to act ac-
cording to frame laws that have been issued by Moscow.
Forest Management
The operational rules in the forest sector have been very much dependent upon the de-
velopment of transportation and harvesting techniques. For centuries, an axe was the
main tool for felling timber and floating the main transportation method for longer dis-
tances. It is not surprising then that early policy makers tried to change the rules of the
game for these variables when trying to implement new policies. Two examples have
been mentioned above: The confiscation of the more accessible forests on behalf of the
Crown under Peter the Great, and private landowners’ charging for axes used for forest
harvesting.
The development of the physical infrastructure made it possible to exploit forest areas
that had earlier been unexploitable due to difficult transport conditions. However, the
new physical infrastructure per se also raised the demand for timber, which was needed
both to develop the railway network and to be used as fuel for steamboats and steam
engines.
The dawn of Russian capitalism also brought about some major changes in the opera-
tional rules due to alterations in the structure of the population. The technical develop-
ment made the Russian feudal economy obsolete, and the manors lost in importance.
Serfdom was finally abolished in 1861, and for those parts of Russia where serfdom had
been present, the abolition meant that a historical continuity was broken, as the liberated
peasants henceforth were denied access to forests belonging to the manors. Until then,
both peasants and landlords had regarded these forests as commons. This forest enclo-
sure movement can best be understood in the light of the growing Russian capitalism
and the industrialization, whereby the forests in the course of time got a clearer and
more distinct market price. A rising class of timber capitalists – with no historical ties to
the forests – bought up the forests belonging to the manors and organized forest har-
vesting according to industrial principles. They also developed special provisory timber
communities, to which timber workers were hired during the winter months. The work-
ing conditions in these communities were dreadful, and among others, Lenin complains
about them (Lenin, 1967). Even on a more general level it seems that the timber com-
munities were mostly outside the control of the Russian authorities.
In accordance with what has already been mentioned about the forest exploitation dur-
ing the 19th century, one may also assume that profit was the main driving force that
determined the harvesting patterns. Because of this, until the revolution in 1917, forests
in some areas were exposed to a ruthless exploitation on a scale never experienced be-
fore.
Reorganizing the Forest Industrial Sector
The Soviet Union reached its peak of development in the beginning of the 1970s. From
this time essentially three types of “forest actors” can be identified. The first is con-
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cerned with the management of forest production, the second with production itself, and
the third type with forestry and environmental protection.
The organizational framework governing forest production underwent administrative
changes during the last decades of Soviet rule. In 1968, the USSR Ministry of the Pulp
and Paper Industry and the USSR Ministry of the Timber and Woodworking Industry
(Minlesprom) were created out of one major ministry, the USSR Ministry of Timber,
Pulp, Paper and Woodworking. The reform was initiated as an attempt to raise produc-
tion, but did not bring any success. After years of arguments between the ministries, and
attempts to distribute blame for production shortfalls, the two ministries were recom-
bined in 1980 into one ministry, the USSR Union-Republic Ministry of the Timber and
Paper Industry, Minlesbumprom (Barr & Braden, 1988: 19). In the beginning of the
1980s, Minlesbumprom controlled about two-thirds of the logging operations in the So-
viet Union, and its timber industries’ section organized more than 3,000 enterprises and
organizations all over the Union.
Until 1971, there were five levels of management in the forest industries. The first level
was the ministry itself, which, in turn, managed a number of glavki, which administered
one line of production each. The third level consisted of the so-called ob"edinenie, or
groupings of enterprises working in a specific geographical region. The fourth level was
made up by smaller combines or state trusts, and finally came the individual enterprises
themselves (Blandon, 1983; Barr & Braden, 1988). This system had serious drawbacks,
mainly due to an overburdened administrative apparatus. Production plans had to be
broken down four times before they eventually reached the final enterprise. In the same
way, the provisional plans that the individual enterprises drew up as the first part of the
planning process were aggregated many times before they reached the ministry. Thus, in
both directions a considerable loss of information occurred that all parties involved suf-
fered from (Blandon, 1983; Barr & Braden, 1988).
The strictly vertical information flow itself also led to undesired side effects. Enterprises
that physically were quite close to each other might have had an interest to co-operate or
to complement each other’s production, but did not do so as they were under the juris-
diction of different glavki and therefore lacked information about each other (Blandon,
1983; Barr & Braden, 1988). The lack of horizontal information still seems to be a very
relevant problem in Russian forestry – a part of the Soviet legacy (Kizilova, 1996).
Besides these problems, the forest industry also suffered from the general problem of
asymmetric information in Soviet industry. Enterprises tried to hide their real capacity
in order to receive production plans that were relatively easy to fulfill, which further
distorted the basic data needed for the planning process (Blandon, 1983).
In 1971, measures were taken in order to simplify the hierarchical structure and dimin-
ish the number of management levels to three. Under the ministry a layer of different
ob"edinenie was formed. This layer consisted of industrial associations, and under this
layer followed the companies themselves. However, in some areas the fourth level with
state trusts – kombinaty – was still maintained. As some of these combines were put di-
rectly under the ministry, they effectively became a kind of ob"edinenie in their own
right. In the beginning of the 1980s, there were a total of 25 ob"edinenie and combines
under the control of Minlesbumprom (Blandon, 1983: 54). This re-organization might
have made planning somewhat easier, but the organization was still too hierarchical to
effectively deal with local problems.
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The actual production level of the logging enterprise was organized in the following
manner: Each ob"edinenie consisted of a number of lespromkhozy, individual logging
enterprises. Usually, each ob"edinenie or combine organized between 15 and 40
lespromkhozy, and in all, there were about 600 of them in the country. Under the juris-
diction of a lespromkhoz there were a number of lesopunkty, normally 2 to 4, attached to
each lespromkhoz, which carried out actual logging operations. As the lesopunkty had
their own equipment, workers, infrastructure and specific logging areas, they are best
understood as independent economic units of a specific lespromkhoz (Blandon, 1983).
Gosleskhoz
Forestry – or silviculture – was administered by the USSR State Forestry Committee, or
Gosleskhoz, which had a union-republic structure.15 It was formed in 1966, but, as pre-
viously stated, its roots can be traced back to 1798 (Barr & Braden, 1988: 20; World
Bank, 1997: 149). During the Soviet period examined here, Goslezkhoz administered
94.6% of the state forests16, controlled about 2,500 organizations concerned with various
silvicultural operations, mostly leskhozy, and supervised about 20 research institutes
(Blandon, 1983: 84; Barr & Braden, 1988: 21).
Gosleskhoz’ silvicultural operations can be divided into four main fields. In its first role
– being in charge of the overall forest management in the Soviet Union – Gosleskhoz
had a responsibility to survey the forest resource and assemble data concerning its con-
stitution in order to achieve a rational management.
The second role, to attend to forest reconstruction, was its main as well as its most re-
source-consuming task. In short, Gosleskhoz collected seeds from desirable tree species,
prepared plantations and grew seedlings and tended both plantations and areas with a
natural regeneration in order to regenerate stands after logging or establish new planta-
tions (Blandon, 1983: 85). In the European parts of the Soviet Union, more forests were
planted than the area of forests that were felled, thereby increasing the total forest area,
whilst in Siberia and the Far East artificial regeneration in most cases was not carried
out at all. As broad-leaved species usually are the first to occupy a harvested area – at
the expense of coniferous species – this means that the species structure in Siberia
slowly underwent degradation from both an ecological and an economic point of view.
The third task that Gosleskhoz had to attend to was timber harvesting. This activity dif-
fered from the one carried out by Minlesbumprom since most of the logging activities of
Gosleskhoz were related to thinning operations and sanitary cuttings.
Finally, Gosleskhoz had jurisdiction over the establishment of forests that were man-
aged for the benefit of agricultural concerns. Apart from these main fields of activity,
Gosleskhoz was responsible for protecting the forests from fire, insects and disease.
                                                
15
  Minlesbumprom was also involved in silvicultural operations. These operations were limited to clearing
of the area logged over from brash and logging waste in order to increase the likelihood of regeneration
by the most desired species, and also to decrease the fire risk. During the 1970s these operations were
questioned by Russian forest scientists as being counterproductive. However, with an increasing demand
of timber, there is a need to utilize all the timber growing on a particular site, including what might once
have been considered as waste. Therefore, one may expect that this practice may even be intensified in
the future (Blandon 1983, p. 84).
16
  The remainder was administered by collective farms, 2.3%, and other administrations, 3.1%.
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Gosleskhoz co-operated with the Council of Ministers of Union Republics in order to
coordinate the work of the republican ministries of forestry.17 These ministries under-
took forestry activities in the republics and supervised the krai and oblast’ forestry and
the ASSR ministries of forestry. The republic ministries and their subordinate admini-
strations controlled various forestry enterprises and combines.
From the outline above, it is clear that the forest sector followed the general patterns of
industrial organization in the Soviet Union. The top of the pyramid, in economics and
politics alike, was the Politbureau. The next in rank in the party hierarchy was the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party, and its economic departments also played an
important role in policy-making. The actual party policy was then carried out by the
above-mentioned Council of Ministers (Brown et al., 1994: 422). The Council of Min-
isters – together with the State Planning Committee, Gosplan18, the Committee on Prices
and the Ministry of Finance as well as special party agencies – made up a part of what
in Soviet parlance was called the nadvedomstvennye agencies, i.e., those standing above
the sectorally specialized agencies (Fortescue, 1997: 14).
Figure 1: Organization chart of the command economy, 1973-91.
Bold lines mark the co-ordination and planning between the central directive agencies. Normal lines
shows the lines of subordination in state sector. The broken line indicates that there was no legal subordi-
                                                
17
  In order to avoid confusion, a short recapitulation of the federalist system in the Soviet Union may be
useful. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a federative construction made up of 4 levels. Under
the all-union level of USSR, came a union-republic level with 15 SSRs, socialist soviet republics, among
which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic or RSFSR was the biggest. All but the smallest
union republics were divided into provinces, some 150 in all. The 20 autonomous republics, the ASSRs,
were equal in size and powers to the 123 oblasti, but besides these, the province level was even made up
by 8 autonomous regions, ARs, 10 autonomous areas, AAs, and 90 cities of Republican subordination.
The fourth level consisted of 902 towns, further divided into urban wards, and 3,225 counties subdivided
into 1,184 towns, 3,992 urban settlements and 42,411 villages (Brown et al. 1994, p. 348).
18
  The State Planning Committee, Gosplan, headed by a deputy premier was the co-ordination planning
agency, responsible to the government. Its task was to ensure the coherence and balance of plans both in
the long and in the short term; it was also responsible for allocating key materials and products to the
principal users. In this it was assisted by the State Committee on Material-Technical Supply (Gossnab),
also headed by a deputy premier. By the method of “material balances” available supplies of the more
important goods were related to estimated requirements, thus identifying the need to increase supplies or
to cut utilization (Brown et al. 1994, p. 422). It is a common misunderstanding that management was told
exactly what to produce. With respect to the sheer number of different products – 12 million according to
a 1977 Soviet estimate – this was an impossible task, whereby it was only about 48,000 core products that

















































nation in the collective sector, but that the Ministry of Agriculture imposed procurement quotas and that
local authorities had certain supervisory powers. Source: Brown et al., 1994.
Under the nadvedomstvennye agencies followed the vedomstvennye agencies, those with
sectoral specialization. The most important of these were the industrial branch minis-
tries. In 1979, there were 31 ministries classified as all-Union, and 22 as Union-
republican. The union-republican ministries had counterparts in the various republics
and most administered their enterprises through some kind of ob"edinenie. As indicated
above, Minlesbumprom and Gosleskhoz were to be found in this group.
The Forest Sector in the Soviet System of Sectoral Specialization
There is no consensus among analysts about how the relationship between the nadve-
domstvennye and vedomstvennye agencies should best be described. Two models seem
to be the most prevalent. The first one draws the picture of a state-run command econ-
omy in which direct state management of the economy predominates, and the second
one describes a sectorally negotiated economy, and its related politics, in terms of
domination by major sectoral groups (Fortescue, 1997).
According to the first model, the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat were
strong political authorities that were able and willing to impose policy relatively
autonomously. To their disposal they had the central administrative agencies with the
capacity to control flows of financial and material resources according to the policy set
by them. The political and administrative center was then in control of the middle-level
structures that implemented its policies through the exercise of day to day control over
the enterprises. This was the role that was played by the branch ministries and their
glavki.
According to the second model, it was the institutional representatives of the dominant
sectors of the economy in the middle-level structures that set the agenda for resource
allocation. As individuals from these dominant sectors were recruited to the sectoral de-
partments of the apparatus of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, of Go-
splan and of others, they were able to take control of the decision-making process. Be-
cause the essential nature of decision-making in the sectorally negotiated economy was
the negotiation of the distribution of resources among narrowly defined and highly spe-
cialized sectors, a premium was put on the ability to argue a narrow and specialized
case. Thus, as a whole, coordinating links came to dominate over hierarchical links in
this ekonomika soglasovanii – economy of agreements (Fortescue, 1997: 3).
Which of the two models is applicable to the forest sector, and what impact did the ac-
tual institutional structure have on forest management? To a certain extent it seems that
both models are applicable. The split of the Ministry of Timber, Pulp, Paper and
Woodworking in 1968 and the merger of the two ministries thus established into Min-
lesbumprom in 1980 shows that responsibility for the organizational design was re-
served for the nadvedomstvennye agencies. During the split, both the Ministry of Tim-
ber and Woodworking and the Ministry of Pulp and Paper had difficulties in meeting
the production demands, which indicates that they had no influence on the planning
process of the nadvedomstvennye organs.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the decisions on organizational design were
made on the basis of information collected by the industrial ministries themselves, and
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thus influenced by these. According to the same logic, the failure of the forest sector to
set the production demand or to obtain more financing for modernization and restoration
for its establishments, may also indicate that the sector participated in a process of sec-
toral negotiation (ekonomika soglasovanii), but that the rewards were modest as its bar-
gain position was weak in comparison with other sectors of greater significance to the
Soviet economy. In 1987, for instance, forestry was just the 7th most important industrial
sector in the Soviet Union19 (Huber et al., 1996: 5).
Nevertheless, it seems that Minlesbumprom or its precursors always played the domi-
nating role towards Gosleskhoz or environmental authorities.
Policy Goals in Russian Forestry
An economic sector or branch of business, like the Russian forest sector and its related
units is always affected by different factors in the surrounding environment, at the same
time as it fulfils a number of functions that can not be considered as being strictly eco-
nomic. On a micro-level, individual firms hardly pay any attention to these circum-
stances, but on an aggregated level, they have an impact on the performance of whole
regions and countries. Therefore, in most countries, the government tries to influence
the decisions of individual firms by setting the rules of the game in form of a battery of
laws, regulations, recommendations, information campaigns, taxes, charges, subsidies,
and so on. These tools are the result of more or less coherent governmental policies,
which are, in turn, formulated upon the Government’s perception of reality and its am-
bition to either bring about a positive development for society as a whole, or to bring
about advantages for its own members or other powerful groups in society.
In the economies of transition in Eastern Europe and in Russia, old policy goals are now
coming under severe pressure. In some cases, they have to be totally abolished, as they
are no longer desirable and obsolete in a society that has changed. In other cases, the
goals prevail, but the means to implement them have to change. In yet other cases, the
priority between policy goals has to change as a result of financial limitations. Whether
or not the country is in a stage of transition the significance of policy-making is consid-
erable.
There can be no surprise then that the World Bank thinks that the most important area
for the Russian Government in its efforts to rebuild the forest sector and setting it on a
sustainable path is “to establish and enforce an enabling policy and regulatory frame-
work that ensures sustainable management of forest resources and helps maximize the
benefits from utilizing and conserving forest resources” (World Bank, 1997: 2-3). Rus-
sia’s current forest policy framework does not adequately support the Government’s
international environmental commitments and it makes private investors hesitant to en-
ter the potentially lucrative forest sector. It also presents obstacles to Russia’s environ-
mental, social, and economic development as well as to the fulfillment of its forest re-
source management objectives.
                                                
19
  Calculated as percentage of total industrial output, the list of the most important industrial sectors was
as follows: Machine building and metal works industry 31.01%; food industry 12.87%; light industry
12.55%; fuel industry 8.78%; chemical and petrochemical industry 7.27%; ferrous metallurgy 5.76 %;
forestry, wood processing, paper and pulp industry 5.71%; non ferrous metallurgy 4.94%; electric power
industry 4.45%; construction material industry 3.84%; flour-grinding, grouts and mixed food industry
2.55%; and glass and china-pottery industry 0.32% (Huber et al. 1996, p. 5).
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In order to create such an enabling policy and regulatory framework, the World Bank
identifies four issues as especially critical. The first issue concerns the legal and regu-
latory framework governing ownership and management of forest land. The second re-
fers to promotion of forest resource sustainability and maintenance of environmental
integrity. The third is about restructuring of the sector to ensure economic sustainability
and viability. Finally, the fourth hints at the strengthening and reinforcement of the so-
cial safety net for the most threatened communities, as well as the development of alter-
native employment opportunities and the maintaining of propitious conditions for the
continuity of traditional communities and economies. How then, and with what meas-
ures, can all this be achieved?
Towards Forest Sustainability?
The domestic Russian market for timber products is potentially very large. The export
market is good already, but could be even further developed as Russia can supply the
market with high-quality wood from slow-growing trees from its northern regions. The
question that has to be answered then is whether or not forest activities are carried out in
such a way that economic sustainability is guaranteed in a longer perspective. This
problem can be examined from at least three different angels. The first refers to the an-
nual allowable cut system in force, the second relates to the resource pricing system that
the processors have to bear, and the third alludes to the value added to timber products
before sale.
The annual allowable cut is a measure of the average volume of wood that may be har-
vested annually under sustained yield management during a ten-year period (World
Bank, 1997). It roughly equals the amount of new growth produced by the forest each
year minus deductions for losses to fire, insects and diseases, and is made up of four dif-
ferent formulas in which the growing stock of mature and maturing forest and estimated
growth are independent variables. The annual allowable cut is calculated at the district
or ranger district level and then aggregated to yield the regional annual allowable cut.
Although the present system for calculating the annual allowable cut is reasonable, in
practice, according to the findings of the World Bank, it has a number of defects that
can lead to distortions and long-term adverse consequences for the sustainability of the
forest resource (World Bank, 1997):
Table 2: Estimated biological forest potential for various regions of Russia. (The forest
harvesting is measured in thousands of cubic meter.)






Siberia 233,286 187,720 - 55,566
Far East 98,546 81,853 4,187 12,506
Europe/Urals 197,575 49,554 5,043 132,978
Total 529,407 319,127 9,230 201,050
Source: Based on State Forest Account of 1993 and obtained from the Federal Forest Service of Russia,
1995, as reported by the World Bank 1997, p. 42.
The absence of local participation in the preparation of management plans results in a
lack of public commitment to the plans and difficulties of implementation. This is a se-
vere shortcoming especially in areas where the forest is the main source of income or
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where forests are close to population centers. Consultation is critical for integrating con-
servation and protection objectives into the plan.
Despite the fact that it is required by regulations, conservation and protected areas are
often not appropriately taken into account in calculating the annual allowable cut. Al-
though each district manager is supposed to follow an annual allowable cut for the indi-
vidual district, there are indications that regionally aggregated annual allowable cuts are
sometimes applied instead, so that some areas become severely overcut while others, –
those that are less accessible – are underutilized. This means that the local logging
community will have to move to new areas, or at least to send their workers to more re-
mote logging areas. In the long run, this is of course not economically sustainable, as
the remoteness will have a severe effect on the economic profitability of the sector.
To maximize production, each stand should be harvested as close as possible to its op-
timum rotation age. The present methods of estimating the annual allowable cut are
probably biased downwards, because the sustainable supply is based on a relatively
small area by assuming that a normal age distribution should be obtained in the long
term. This underestimation of the forest growth will also reduce the calculated annual
allowable cut.
International experience shows that a competitive forest industry requires a resource
pricing system that makes processors bear the full cost of timber production. Many for-
est-rich countries, Russia included, have subsidized their industrial sectors by keeping
the costs of timber artificially low, either by energy or transportation subsidies to the
timber industry or by different trade barriers. In Russia this has led to large inefficien-
cies in processing, uneconomic location of processing capacity, excessive industrial ca-
pacity and low investment in resource management.
The most significant source of inefficiency is the stumpage system. In most stumpage
systems the rent accruing to the resource owner is the residual amount after operating
costs and enterprise profits have been deducted from the sales price. In Russia, stump-
age fees are too low, nontransparent, and levied only on timber removed from the forest
rather than on all timber cut. As minimum stumpage fees are the same all over Russia,
enterprises with lower operating costs or better-quality wood are favored at the expense
of others. This system of underpricing of timber was a part of the Soviet model for eco-
nomic development, transferring wealth from agriculture and forestry to the industrial
sector in order to finance the industrialization process. Today this system has become
completely obsolete. A properly designed stumpage system could provide powerful in-
centives for improved efficiency and sustainable forest management. Resource pricing
can be designed to motivate resource users to optimize resource utilization on a sustain-
able basis.
Another aspect of economic sustainability is the value added to wood products. As Rus-
sia as a whole recovers from the first years of transition and the agricultural and indus-
trial sectors start to work normally, real wages will rise in all branches. In order not to
lose trained and skilled workers as well as competent managers, wages in the forest
sector will have to follow this development of the economy. However, there is an upper
limit for wages in the forest sector, which is basically set by the value of timber on the
international market. When the stumpage value approaches the “red numbers” as opera-
tion costs increase, imports will be substituted for wood production, and domestic out-
put will turn insignificant. This is one of the classic traps that strike most providers of
raw material. The likewise classic solution to this dilemma is to enhance the value
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added of the product, that is, to increase the average productivity of each worker. If the
government fulfils its declared intentions in this field, it would mean that Russia can
maintain or even increase its export earnings from forest products, while, at the same
time, reduce its raw wood requirements and strengthen local economies by increasing
exports of value-added processed timber rather than raw logs.
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Chapter 3
Ministerial Spin-Offs and Economic




This project studies post-Soviet transformation on an industry level. Why industries,
rather than larger overarching sectors, regions, or individual enterprises? For one thing,
industrial branch – otrasl’ – was a decisive organizational category in Soviet times. Not
only were enterprises, throughout most of Soviet history, administered by specialized
branch production ministries, but even the Central Committee Apparatus itself, along
with the planning organization Gosplan, was largely organized along sectoral industrial
lines. Industries thus formed established organizational fields with a relatively clearly
defined identity and outer boundaries. The industry level therefore is a potentially very
fruitful unit of analysis in studying the ongoing process of transformation. This becomes
all the more important given the historical record of branch agencies: Generally
throughout the Soviet period, while formal organizations remained fluid and were char-
acterized by permanent restructuring, merging and splitting up of individual organiza-
tions and the introduction or abolition of middle administrative layers, under the surface
there was substantial personal as well as task continuity. This makes it all the more
challenging to investigate their fate under radical economic and political transformation.
Methodologically, this project has been inspired by a growing number of interdiscipli-
nary studies of what has been described as, variously, “business systems,” “governance
of economic sectors” or yet other terms. In this context, the subtle differences between
these concepts need concern us less than the commonalities. Unlike the industrial or-
ganization tradition of economic research that restricts itself to explaining degrees of
aggregation and disaggregation among a population of firm-level actors, sectoral gov-
ernance approaches try to capture patterns of interaction between private and public ac-
tors, firms and collective organizations within the context of a given industry. In a fur-
ther divergence from orthodox economic approaches, markets are not assumed as a
natural state. Rather, they are created in a historical process and compete for dominance
with other forms of governance such as hierarchies, networks or clans and formal asso-
ciations. Both of these assumptions can be uniquely helpful in studying post-communist
transformation processes which are faced with precisely the problem of creating gov-
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ernance structures from scratch. The breakdown of Soviet-style central management in
this perspective does not automatically lead to the emergence of markets (as has indeed
become increasingly obvious in the past few years): Many other possible arrangements
are at least imaginable, even if not desirable in terms of their economic efficiency. Care-
ful empirical study is needed to discover the actual governance structures that have
emerged since 1991.
Since the sectoral governance perspective has as its arena industries in their entirety,
empirical research faces specific methodological problems. Clearly, analysis has to go
beyond the purely micro-economic. Economic transformation at the enterprise level is
of course crucial. Surveys of enterprise directors are beginning to yield valuable insights
into whether and to what extent Soviet-style enterprises are becoming firms and hence,
strategic actors, rather than the mere accounting units they were in Soviet times. But this
is not the whole story. Enterprises (as yet, probably still a minority of them) may in-
creasingly abandon their old paternalistic role vis-à-vis the workforce; they may re-
structure production and begin paying attention to their balance sheets (again, not nec-
essarily in a majority of cases). However, while such changes would be very indicative,
they cannot offer conclusive evidence on the predominance – or not – of market regula-
tion. While many Russian enterprises may tend to concentrate on either a market-
oriented or rent-seeking strategy at the expense of the other, there remains something
spurious about the distinction, as Western firms – perfectly happy to combine market
strategies with calls for subsidies or access restriction – have amply demonstrated.
Rather than the purely micro-economic level, hence, we need to form a picture of a
complex set of relationships encompassing the interplay of government policy, various
intermediary bodies and regional actors in both the economic and political realm. This,
of course, is a broad organizational field hard to capture in its entirety. The strategy I
have chosen here is to focus on a subset of organizations I have called “ministerial spin-
offs.” The abolition (at least in name) of the huge sectoral bureaucracies after 1991 left
thousands of former administrators out of work. Not surprising, therefore, a variety of
new organizations has formed in Moscow – and to a lesser degree in regional capitals –
all of them in one way or another drawing on former ministerial resources such as staff,
knowledge, connections and all too often also material assets. I believe such spin-offs
can be useful indicators; what form and functions they assume is deeply connected with
the particular governance logic emerging in the post-Soviet period. Ministerial succes-
sor organizations may really be ministries in disguise, while in a market-oriented con-
text the more obvious course for them will presumably be to take up commercial inter-
mediation of one kind or another.
Three developmental scenarios
In what direction, then, is the Russian timber industry evolving? I would like to propose
several alternative scenarios of possible transformation, based on, respectively, institu-
tional inertia, marketization, or a far-reaching devolution of power to the regional level.
The first scenario is based on the high resilience that branch production bodies have tra-
ditionally shown in Soviet history. Thus, for instance, in the “Sovnarkhoz” reforms of
the Khrushchev period the branch principle of administration was temporarily aban-
doned in favor of regionally based management encompassing different industries.
However, this attempt failed and after the fall of Khrushchev branch ministries were
restored – remarkably, in spite of the eight-year period elapsed since their liquidation,
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with top leadership much the same as before the reforms. There are some indicators of
similar trends in the post-Soviet period. While privatization has given enterprises formal
independence, many of them at least nominally have remained members of overarching
Moscow-based organizations. These bodies, according to their charters, are devoted to
industry-wide coordination and information issues (some of the former tasks of branch
production ministries); they often play an important role in foreign trade negotiations.
This scenario implies a strongly path-dependent form of development. While radical
change does occur in it, there is also a considerable underlying continuity. The names
and legal form of the organizations are more or less radically modified and their tasks
are adjusted to conform to the larger changes going on in the overall economy (indeed
they may even be phrased in the language of the market). However, they do retain a ba-
sic organizational integrity.
An alternative scenario would be that of a successful transition to the market. Formal
rules governing economic behavior have changed radically over the last decade; it is
reasonable to assume that, over time, adaptation or new entry will create organizations
capable of benefiting from the environmental changes. Firms as strategic actors, thus,
should gradually emerge from Soviet-style enterprises, either through privatization and
reform or in the form of various enterprise spin-offs or joint ventures with foreign firms.
As to the main focus of this investigation, ministerial spin-offs can be expected to
evolve to form the backbone of a class of commercial intermediaries such as trading
houses, banks, commodities exchanges, and above all, all sort of consulting services.
Furthermore, if we widen the narrowly neoclassical analysis to a more socially embed-
ded view of market economies, one would also expect to see various non-profit inter-
mediaries such as professional and business organizations. Indeed many such bodies
have emerged in name at least, and analysts have interpreted their appearance as an in-
evitable component of democratic and market transformation. Fragmented and weak
though they may be at present, business associations are expected to consolidate over
time; they are viewed as a partial reemergence of civil society. Soviet-style top-down
branch management organs, on the other hand, may so far have managed to survive as
organizations, but one would expect their role (if indeed they still play one at all) to di-
minish rapidly as Soviet-style enterprises become fully-fledged firms and start devel-
oping their own strategies, rather than relying on central guidance.
While the first scenario stands for basic organizational continuity, or minimal change,
and the second one for a market-oriented development, yet another, third scenario is
imaginable, and indeed frequently encountered in the literature. Both the previous sce-
narios operate on a national level; spin-offs take on different roles depending on the
character of the system. A third approach would have to emphasize the growing region-
alization of once-centralized Russia. Central organizations – post-Soviet dinosaurs and
adaptive market creatures alike – in this view no longer have their former decisive im-
pact on political and economic life in the country’s provinces; as a proponent of this
school of thought put it succinctly (Vorozheikina, 1994: 115), “local, authoritarian mini-
regimes have emerged whose power is based on the virtually uncontrolled distribution
of resources.” More often than not, such regimes are hesitant modernizers. Regional re-
gimes are often described as regressive and traditionalist; in Russia itself in particular
medieval images (“regional suzerainties,” “feudalization”) have been much evoked.
In order to facilitate meaningful discussion of the above scenarios, I will begin by pre-
senting a narrative section detailing the institutional development of the timber industry
roughly from 1992 to 1995 and introducing the main organizational actors and their in-
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terrelationships. This will be followed by a second section describing one particular po-
litical event that took place in 1996: the creation of a State Committee for the Timber
Industry. This episode, as the analysis will show, is particularly well suited to shed light
on the peculiar logic of center-regional and state-society relations dominating the post-
Soviet timber industry. A concluding section reexamines the initial three scenarios
based on the empirical evidence introduced in the main part.
Organizational Transformation in the Russian Timber In-
dustry, 1992–1995
The collapse of the old Soviet system of branch administration did not happen over-
night; in the majority of cases, this process extended over several years. Curtailing the
central bureaucracy had been a stated goal of perestroika policies; a crucial element of
this was the 1987 Law on State Enterprises which greatly extended the powers of enter-
prise managers. This became the starting point for a wave of ministerial reorganizations,
beginning in 1988, which transformed entire ministries or their subunits into state-
owned “concerns” or “associations.” Compared to other cases, the transformation of the
timber industry was both slower and less successful. Ministerial documents from 1988
are still dominated by traditional Soviet-style tinkering with hierarchical levels. The
crucial step towards corporatization was taken only in 1991 with the creation of a “state
corporation” called Rossiiskie lesopromyshlenniki (Russian Timber Industrialists).1
Headed by a former deputy minister, Igor Sankin, this entity in Sankin’s (10/10/96) own
words “took up the flag of the ministry,” retaining basic managerial functions (vlastnye
funktsii) with regard to enterprises in the industry . However, it did not outlast the end of
the year and even during its short existence was undermined by secession.2
The Year Zero: 1992
After the demise of the old Soviet Union, the reformist policies of the young Russian
government soon affected the forest industries. As in other sectors, managerial rights
proper were transferred to the newly created State Property agency. Rossiiskie lesopro-
myshlenniki was abolished as a state corporation, becoming instead the nucleus of a
Timber Industry Department (again headed by Sankin) within the new, encompassing
Ministry of Industry.3 This new agency, however, did not last long, as the Ministry itself
was liquidated in July 1992 after an existence of only nine months (Sankin 10/10/96).
                                                
1
  It is not quite clear whether this was more a top-down or bottom-up process, and who initiated it. West-
ern observers tend to consider corporatization as a ministerial survival strategy, essentially a defensive
reaction by the central bureaucratic economic apparatus to hostile government policies. However, the
slow speed of this development in the timber case could also indicate a transformation forced upon an
initially disinclined bureaucracy. As outlined above, ministerial prikazy in 1988 still display very tradi-
tional ideas. A later (October 1989) prikaz first envisages broader change, demanding a structural trans-
formation of the industry based on a clear separation of state administration and direct economic man-
agement (gosudarstvennoe upravlenie and neposredstvennoe khoziastvovanie), but only with the 1991
corporatization do we see a hesitant step in this direction, soon to be overtaken by events.
2
  According to Tatsiun (1996, p. 25), the corporation was deserted by the Arkhangelsk conglomerate
“Severoles”, the paper concern “Bumaga”, the Bratsk Timber Industrial Complex and the ob"edinenie
“Irkutsklesprom.”
3
  On the continuity of these two organizations, see Tatsiun (1996, p. 20).
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Although other departments regained organizational independence in some form or
other, no successor organization was ever formed for the timber industry. This did not
mean the complete abandoning of the branch principle in this sector: specialized timber
industry units continued to exist within major economic agencies (the Finance and Eco-
nomics Ministries, in particular). However, it meant the end of a specialized branch
management body, in conformity to official government policy whose stated aim, then
as now, was the creation of functional instead of branch agencies. Little complied with
in almost all other cases, this policy did indeed succeed in the timber industry, perhaps –
as was occasionally suggested to me – in order to demonstrate Russia’s readiness for
market reforms to international lending agencies. But paradoxically, this abolishment in
no way signified a lessening of state intervention in the industry. Export regulations re-
mained in place, state subsidies – in particular, seasonal loans for logging enterprises –
continued to play an important role, and just a year or so down the road detailed state
intervention even rose significantly with the advent of mass industrial privatization. In
the absence of other organs familiar with technical and firm-by-firm details, something
of a vacuum seems to have been created.
Precisely why the timber industry experienced a sharper organizational break than other
industries is still unclear. What is clear is that nobody, not even the old ministerial appa-
ratus, put up much of a fight to preserve branch management. Former ministers and
deputy ministers had more important irons to grind: Many of them were busy setting up
their own commercial organizations. Igor Sankin, head of the ill-fated state corporation,
set up a commercial organization almost identical in name with the former monopolist.
Continuities between the two organizations, I was told, go far beyond the name only. In
my interview with him, Sankin affirmed that his new joint-stock company had taken
over a fair number of former ministerial workers, but denied any other continuities.
However, as I learned from other sources, the new company did indeed inherit some
substantial material assets, in particular the former ministry building itself – a prime
chunk of real estate right in the center of Moscow (Stepanov, 10/10/96)4. Rent pay-
ments, in consequence, became an important source of income for Rossiiskie lesopro-
myshlenniki; other income came from the provision of various services, in particular in
the areas of foreign trade and of engineering services. The joint-stock company thus
clearly built on the expertise and connections of the old ministerial staff.5
Sankin’s was not an unusual case; there are several other cases in which former high
ministry officials set up shop on their own. Mikhail Busygin, a Brezhnev-era minister,
                                                
4
  I have no information as to the mechanics of this transfer; one reasonable assumption might be that the
joint-stock company, in a classic example of insider privatization, “bought” the building at an articially
deflated prize.
5
  Interestingly, in spite of its obvious commercial success, the company’s leadership seems hesitant to
embrace market principles. Sankin, talking about the organization’s early period, felt compelled to justify
its creation with a conspiracy theory involving both the evil government and evil foreign capitalists; the
founders of “Russian Timber Industrialists”, he asserts, were trying simultaneously to make a profit
(zarabotat’ sebe nazhit’) and to “resist government attempts to liquidate the industry” (all interview
10/10/96). The alleged liqiduation policy, according to Sankin, consisted of government attempts to break
up larger technological complexes and thus to disrupt production. The underlying motivation for this sup-
posedly lay in the desire to benefit foreign competitors. Details, in this theory, become somewhat fuzzy:
When asked to expand, Sankin identified possible foreign beneficiaries of such a policy as mainly Scan-
dinavian, yet at the same time explained the Russian government’s willingness to conspire to their ad-
vantage with pressure from U.S. institutions. The inconsistency of this scenario did not seem to fully reg-
ister.
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came to head the foreign trade association Vneshles, while Busygin’s successor as min-
ister, Vladimir Melnikov, was president of the joint-stock company Soiuz lesopromysh-
lennikov.6 Around these, and often connected through cross-holdings or overlapping
membership, a variety of other organizations emerged: a timber industry insurance
company, a “Timber Bank” (Lesnoi bank), a specialized timber commodity exchange,
and other, similar bodies.
This sort of organization-building was not restricted to the commercial sector proper:
two separate timber industry associations were also set up in mid-1992. The “Union of
Timber Exporters” (Soiuz lesoeksporterov) was set up in July 1992; a “Union of Timber
Industrialists” (Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov) followed months later. Just like other 1992
startups, these two bodies were created by old ministry insiders. However, there were
crucial differences between them with regard to numbers, functions and above all, coa-
lition politics. Soiuz lesoeksporterov has been operating mostly independently although
– as will be outlined later – it had allies in part of the state apparatus. As already indi-
cated by its name, from its very beginning it was a more narrowly targeted organization,
with fairly high dues and a purely organizational membership encompassing large re-
gional timber industry conglomerates and trading firms; it clearly identified itself as as-
sotsiatsiia predprinimatelei, or business association (Stepanov, 9/30/96). Soiuz leso-
promyshlennikov, in contrast, operated under the more traditional Soviet label of
obshchestvennaia organizatsiia (“social organization”). In public statements, the soiuz
presented itself as a professional rather than as a business association; its chairman
Lipman in an interview once described the organization’s clientele as “those working in
our industry.” Membership, although based on collective instead of individual member-
ship, went far beyond producers to include, for example, forestry research institutes.
Regional governments from timber-producing regions also played an important role;
from newspaper reports, it seems that almost a third of delegates at national Soiuz con-
ferences had been nominated by regional governments and not by enterprises (Levina,
1995b). So far, I have little information on the political circumstances surrounding the
association’s founding; in the years to come Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov was to be
firmly associated with the resurrection of central branch administration that began to
take place from 1993 onwards.
The Emergence of Roslesprom
What is striking about this wave of start-ups is the way in which they all emerged within
months, if not weeks, of each other. This suggests that what went on in 1992 may have
had less to do with the emergence of a market infrastructure from under the ministerial
rubble (a process that by its nature should have been more gradual), and very much
more with old bureaucrats frantically trying to create new organizational roofs for them-
selves. Most of the new “commercial” bodies were closely allied with state structures.
Only in December 1992, when the main spoils were already divided, did a government
resolution create yet another, minor organization devoted to the humdrum task of sci-
ence funding and research coordination: Roslesprom, the nucleus of the later state
committee. Different from the more profitable joint-stock companies set up by the min-
isterial top brass, this was headed by a young man, Miron Tatsiun – then in his mid-
                                                
6
 This latter organization should not be confused with the almost identically named interest organization
headed by David Lipman.
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thirties – who had never worked for Minlesprom. Roslesprom’s subordinate status was
confirmed by the politics of space: According to its founding documents, the organiza-
tion was not assigned to the main ministerial building on Telegrafnyi pereulok, but to a
secondary location on Bolshoi Kiselnyi which had, under Brezhnev, housed auxiliary
organizations to the ministry.7 Formally, Roslesprom was a public company (gosu-
darstvennaia kompaniia); its chairman was to be appointed by the State Property Com-
mittee, and Roslesprom itself was to be an economically independent, profit-making
entity. In terms of substance, it seems to have been intended to deal with some of the
less pleasant, less profitable coordination needs that could not be immediately privat-
ized, leaving the ex-nomenklatura bosses free to make money. However, such a view
underestimated Tatsiun’s extraordinary political skill; it was not long before Ros-
lesprom’s role was to change dramatically.
In a process beginning just months after its creation and continuing into 1994, Ros-
lesprom succeeded in acquiring a whole series of important functions theoretically in
the domain of the “functional” ministries. To name just some of the most important, an
agreement with the Finance Ministry made Roslesprom the official intermediary for
government loans and subsidies to the industry, and the Economics Ministry gave it
authority to allocate export quotas (“Ekspertnoe zakliuchenie…” 1996). Roslesprom
was also empowered to administer the government shares in fully or partly state-owned
enterprises; as a result, its representatives became board members of some of the main
timber conglomerates, as well as infrastructure organizations such as ports.
While the formal side of this process is well documented, the inside story is harder to
reconstruct. It is clear that Tatsiun was very skillful at building alliances with key fig-
ures in government: among others, Aleksandr Shokhin, Vladimir Panskov, and Oleg
Soskovets8 threw in their weight behind his agency. How Tatsiun managed to secure
their support is bound to remain inside information. However, there is revealing evi-
dence in at least one case: Igor Shurchkov, the former head of the State Committee for
Industry, Goskomprom, which also had delegated substantive rights to Roslesprom,
years later came to head a Roslesprom daughter company in Boston.
A Russian-Style Quango
Roslesprom had become a quasi-state committee. As such, it developed the usual activi-
ties associated with such a body: In cooperation with the unions, it took part in the for-
mulation of labor safety measures and of a new (largely theoretical) industry-wide wage
agreement. It also, in 1995, published a “Federal Program for the Development of the
Timber Industry” – one more in a growing series of industry-specific programs (devoted
to goals as diverse as the survival of Russian aerospace and the development of fast-
food restaurants) more remarkable for their world view and language use than their
contents. To read speeches by Roslesprom officials, this program was to be a major step
towards a government industrial policy for the forestry scetor; however, it was drawn up
haphazardly, with very little preparation going into it. It is fairly obvious that Ros-
lesprom’s real resources and energy were spent elsewhere.
                                                
7
  Cf. Roslesprom ustav; also Minlesbumprom phone directories 1980 and 1984.
8
  Then, respectively, economics minister, finance minister, and deputy prime minister.
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Besides taking on a regulatory role, Roslesprom also expanded the purely commercial
side of its operations, often using its newly acquired gatekeeper position in order to take
over potentially lucrative activities or existing firms. In the most visible of these cases,
Roslesprom took over the network of foreign representative offices belonging to the
former Soviet timber trade organization Eksportles, incorporating them into its own
commercial daughter company, Roseksportles. It also created, or took over, an industry-
specific insurance company intended primarily to cater to timber workers. Its standards
body, Lessertika, has been trying to monopolize export certification, and its latest busi-
ness venture, Lestorgtrans, founded only in 1995, is a commercial intermediator in the
transport sector.
Empire-Building and its Limits
The two different aspects of Roslesprom’s activities – the regulatory and the commer-
cial – were never clearly separated. Examples of the abuse of its regulatory/allocative
powers for commercial profit abound. It was not uncommon, for example, for Ros-
lesprom to demand that enterprises, which were allocated subsidized loans or export
quota, conduct their export through the Roslesprom subsidiary, Roseksportles. The
commission charged for such deals by Roseksportles often significantly exceeded the
market rate (by as much as a whole percentage point). Such practices were widely criti-
cized within the industry; Roslesprom officials, however, not only did not see any harm
in them but on the contrary considered them as beneficial for the industry. Thus, in an
interview published in 1995, Roseksportles General Director Kazikaev (1995) openly
criticized the allocation of government loans to some of Russia’s largest timbermills on
the grounds that they were refusing to export through his agency: “I have to say that
such a policy is not conducive to a growth of export volumes, nor to its enhanced effi-
ciency.”
Monopoly, in this perspective, is equated with efficiency, and the interests of the indus-
try are seen as identical with the interests of Roslesprom. This sheds a different light on
the company’s stated aim, repeated in many speeches and official documents, to assist
the formation of market institutions in the timber sector.9 “Market infrastructure.” in
Roslesprom’s parlance, does not imply the competitive exchange relationships normally
associated with the term. Rather, it seems to refer to the construction of the commercial
empire just described above: the “Roslesprom system,” a sectoral monopoly complete
with its own “market” organizations such as banks or insurance companies, yet devoid
of competitive elements.10 Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov – Tatsiun’s tame business organi-
zation – was another part of this setup, as will be shown in the following.
Monopolization was pursued particularly vigorously in the regions. Under the catch-
phrase of “restoring governability” Roslesprom pursued a policy of recentralization, at-
tempting to restore overarching governance structures that would encompass producers
in the regions. The main instrument towards this goal was the creation of timber indus-
try kholdingi – regional holding companies (often based on old regional administrative
                                                
9
  After Roslesprom’s rebirth as Goskomlesprom (see next section), “assistance in the creation of a market
infrastructure” was one of the most frequently stated goals in its charter. This, incidentally, also applies to
the ustavs of other state commitees which may have inspired the much later Goskomlesprom document.
(See Fortescue, 1997.)
10
  See on this the description in Trud, May 21, 1996, “Est' li vykhod iz ‘debrei’ lesnogo kompleksa?”
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units) that were transferred some of the remaining state shares in enterprises under pri-
vatization. But while the topic rated high on Roslesprom’s agenda and indeed for a long
time came to very much dominate the company’s official statements, a sober assessment
shows that its attempt to remonopolize the industry had essentially failed – at least as far
as stated policy goals go.11 Holdings had indeed been formed on paper, but none of them
held controlling shares in the enterprises they comprised. As far as corporate govern-
ance goes, enterprise management seems to have largely ignored them.
Empire-building efforts on the Moscow level also encountered difficulties. Above I
have described some of the success stories, such as, in particular, the very public take-
over of Eksportles assets. Other attempts fared less well. An attempted takeover of Ros-
siiskie lesopromyshlenniki ended ambiguously.12 Roslesprom also tried to integrate the
existing independent business associations into its “system.” This was a complete suc-
cess with the “Timber Industrialists Union,” Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov, which for all
practical purposes became a Roslesprom subunit. As of 1995, Soiuz membership had
been boosted to around eight hundred, mainly because it had been joined by many sub-
sidiaries of Roslesprom-sponsored kholdingi. The Roslesprom mother organization itself
also became a member. Interlocking board memberships were a further factor integrat-
ing the two organizations.
As far as policies went, the Soiuz agenda was consistently controlled by Roslesprom.
Leading Roslesprom officials occupied key policy-making positions within the Soiuz. In
one case, a deputy Roslesprom chairman was simultaneously heading the Committee for
Timber Export of Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov – supposedly in his civilian persona
(Levina, 1995a). Even Soiuz chairman Lipman, in interviews published in the quasi-
official Lesnaia gazeta, made no bones about Roslesprom’s decisive influence on his
organization’s policies. Far from stressing his agency’s independent weight, he on the
contrary emphasized Soviet-style interorganizational harmony, claiming that “we work
in close contact with [..] Roslesprom. Together we are defending the interests of the in-
dustry on the federal level” (Levina, 1995a). According to Lipman, federal decisions
benefiting the industry had most often been initiated by Roslesprom, while the role of
Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov was one of “active participation in preparing and promoting
them.” Once decisions had been formally taken, it furthermore fell to his organization to
oversee their implementation on the enterprise level (Levina, 1995a). This is remarkably
reminiscent of Soviet institutional arrangements, when a main function of, for instance,
the trade unions had been to act as a transmission belt within enterprises. Today, al-
though forms were adapted to suit modern times, the spirit has remained much the same.
In another example of such adaptation, the Soiuz has under Roslesprom’s guidance been
                                                
11
 Of course, it is far from clear whether Roslesprom’s main concern in promoting the kholdingi actually
coincided with its stated aim of “restoring governability” and reuniting technologically linked production
chains. In the (improbable) case that one could obtain the data, the whole story could possibly be retold
focusing on corruption and rent-seeking and the such. Holdings, in many cases, served as conduits for
government funding; this circumstance was an important incentive for their creation. Romanov (1995)
argues that some regional governments supported holdings precisely because they were sponsored from
Moscow and hence could be expected to channel resources into the region – whether they would actually
reach the enterprise level is another question.
12
 The background for this takeover attempt apparently lay in the fact that Rossiiskie lesopromyshlenniki
owned the former ministerial building. In the end, the takeover target formally retained its independence,
but according to rumors it had to cede substantial numbers of its shares to Roslesprom chairman Tatsiun
personally.
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participating in pseudocorporatist exercises on the federal level, such as the Tripartite
Commission. Following models from Western industrial democracies, this Commission
has sought to bring together employers, labor and governmental institutions, however
with – predictably – limited effect; its main raison d’etre likely has been as a public re-
lations exercise designed to confer legitimacy on the new Yeltsin-era institutions (cf.
Fortescue, 1997; Urban, 1997).
Much as their mutual relationship suited the interest of both Roslesprom and the Union,
it was marred by the fact that Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov did not possess a representa-
tional monopoly in its field. Its rival, the Union of Timber Exporters, was closely ori-
ented towards a type of economic and export issues in which Roslesprom itself had a
direct interest. For example, Soiuz lesoeksporterov was among the initiators of bilateral
industry-to-industry talks with Finland and Japan about the pricing of certain categories
of wood exports.13 In subsequent years, however, Roslesprom came to increasingly
dominate this and similar fora. Its motives for this were probably twofold: For one
thing, by getting involved in international talks Roslesprom could hope to raise its le-
gitimacy vis-à-vis both its basis and a government on which it was dependent for re-
sources and status. On a more materialistic level, involvement also gave Roslesprom the
chance to establish a gatekeeper position in yet another field; further down the line this
might enable it to exploit this position in order to channel business to its commercial
subsidiaries. How well such aspirations would mesh with the spirit of voluntary talks is
another question. And indeed, after Roslesprom’s takeover the climate of the talks
shifted markedly away from negotiation and compromise. Roslesprom’s attempts to
dictate final outcomes drew angry protests from Scandinavian participants, allegedly
leading to a complaint with the Council of Europe. Detailed information has been hard
to come by so far; however, what concerns me here is not so much the precise character
and significance of the talks process itself as the internal Russian rivalries manifested by
the occasion.
For Roslesprom to achieve its ambitions required sidelining Soiuz lesoekporterov. The
strategy it employed in pursuit of this goal was quite aggressive, aimed not so much at a
takeover as at a complete extermination of the enemy (who, incidentally, in the Ros-
lesprom-dominated press was never mentioned by name). The Timber Producers’ Un-
ion, Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov, was renamed to “Union of Timber Producers and Tim-
ber Exporters” (Soiuz lesopromyshlennikov i lesoeksporterov). A separate Timber Ex-
porters’ Union, this clearly signaled, would henceforth be superfluous. More seriously,
a number of separate new trade bodies – dubbed “flying associations” by their oppo-
nents – were set up to handle questions of export to specific countries. The initiative on
their creation was taken from above, by Roslesprom leadership. On May 24, 1995, the
Roslesprom extended board (razshirennaia kollegiia) took the decision to create two
new associations, dedicated to trade with, respectively, Scandinavia and Japan. At the
same meeting founding committees (orgkomitety) were set up. They contained the usual
circle of uchrediteli – founding enterprises – from both regions and the capital, many of
them Roslesprom allies.14 Konstantin Prodaivoda – a former Minlesprom deputy minis-
ter and by then the Timber Producers’ Union vice-president for exports – was chosen to
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 At least according to its chairman (Stepanov 10/8/96). I have yet to locate written sources confirming
this information.
14
 That assumes orgkomitet members and uchrediteli are identical: I have data on the former for the Japan
and on the latter for the Scandinavia trade association.
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head the cumbersomely named “Association of Exporters of Timber to Scandinavian
Countries” (Assotsiatsiia eksporterov lesomaterialov na rynok skandinavskikh stran).15
His first interview in this new capacity – without ever mentioning the competitors – an-
nounced that his organization would “[coordinate] price lists on timber with the Scandi-
navian customers” and “report them in advance to Roslesprom and Soiuz lesopromysh-
lennikov.”
Ultimately, Roslesprom’s annihilation strategy failed. To be sure, Soiuz lesoeksporterov
emerged from the confrontation much weakened. At the time I conducted the bulk of
my interviews in 1996, it was widely regarded as having lost much of its former impor-
tance. It had lost members, or in some cases expelled them for nonpayment of dues; by
1996 it was down to sixty from an initial ninety-odd (Stepanov, 9/30/96). A sizable loss,
certainly. Viewed differently, though, it was no mean achievement for the Soiuz to hang
on to two thirds of its membership in spite of its overall loss of authority, the turmoil of
post-Soviet transition, and the high fees ($5,000 p.a.) it was charging members. Even at
the height of public hostility between the two organizations, it had retained its public
standing: For example, it was still included in Russian delegations to trade talks abroad.
Most importantly, it was still doing well enough to pay its rents and support a staff of
six16 (Stepanov, 9/30/96). To what extent, then, did it still offer an alternative to Ros-
lesprom? Before answering this question, I will first explore the overall pattern of in-
terorganizational relationships in the industry as they had developed by that time.
Two Camps? The Logic of Multiple Membership
As we have seen, Roslesprom’s empire-building efforts, while effective in many re-
spects, were no unqualified success. Paradoxically, they may even have unintentionally
united the opposition. Roslesprom’s all-out warfare and the vicious attacks and counter-
attacks in the press had led to a wide-spread public perception that two opposing camps
had formed in the industry. A Russian journalist characterized the situation in 1995 as
the not-so-peaceful coexistence of two “fairly clearly formed verticals”: one of them
“semi-state” (polugosudarstvennoe) – encompassing Roslesprom itself as well as the
“holdings” and subsidiaries under its control – the other a “purely marketized system”
built around Rossiiskie lesopromyshlenniki and Eksportles (Solodov, 1995).
Such a description, however, leaves much to be desired. It evades the issue of what
united the members of a camp: ownership ties, political or commercial interaction?
Furthermore, it suggests a degree of stability and exclusiveness of the two groups that,
on careful examination, did not correspond to reality. The exact boundaries of the two
“camps” were unclear: depending on one’s interlocutor and varying also across time,
organizations were assigned now to one group, then to the other. Pillarization, moreo-
ver, seemed to be completely absent. A thorough look at the respective camps’ member-
ship (in particular on the regional level) reveals an astonishing amount of overlap,
which is hard to reconcile with the image of two competing systems based on different
governance modes. It is interesting to examine membership lists for Soiuz le-
soesporterov from 1993 and 1995. Members were primarily mainly composed of big
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  Lesnaia gazeta, July 11, 1995, p. 1, “Sozdana Assotsiaciia eksporterov lesomaterialov na rynok
skandinavskikh stran.” Prodaivoda was deputy minister under Brezhnev bringing him up to retirement
age at the time of his appointment in 1995.
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  There were plans to cut the staff by one or two.
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regional conglomerates and trading firms (such as Severoeksportles and Dal’les in the
Russian Far East); many of these firms were at the same time also associated with Ros-
lesprom. For example, one of the Soiuz members was Sakhalinlesprom. Thus publicly
associated with Roslesprom’s opponents, this conglomerate from the island of Sakhalin
simultaneously occupied a very influential position within Roslesprom. Its chairman,
Boris Maslii, was a member of the Roslesprom board17; Sakhalinlesprom’s economic
achievements have been widely touted in Roslesprom-friendly publications such as
Lesnaia gazeta, and the company was given special assistance in preparing investment
projects. One could probably find similar information on other Soiuz members.
These findings suggest that the timber industry was not so much characterized by two
“camps,” but rather by opposing leadership groups working for an almost identical ba-
sis. Such multiple membership patterns raise a host of very interesting theoretical ques-
tions, which I will elaborate on in a later section. For now, however, I will return to my
earlier question, made all the more urgent by these latest findings: Given its diminished
policy role and widespread dual enrollment, what makes it worthwhile for members to
maintain paid membership in Soiuz lesoeksporterov?
The answer to this question has to be sought on the level of organizational networks.
Since its creation, Soiuz lesoeksporterov was closely connected with the Ministry for
Foreign Economic Relations (MVES). The reasons for this can be found in the MVES’
own survival strategy. From 1992 on, the gradual extension of foreign trade liberaliza-
tion began to threaten the institution’s very existence. In response, MVES helped or-
ganize a number of industry-specific foreign trade associations. Henceforth, then, the
agency’s new role would be to assist the self-organization of industry. Soiuz lesoek-
sporterov was one of the earliest such associations. This is not to say it was actually set
up by MVES; rather, the two organizations’ interests coincided, making them pursue a
strategy of mutual support. MVES would thus gain a new and alternative source of le-
gitimacy, while the Soiuz could expect benefits for its members’ export operations. This
was true especially of the early post-Soviet years: With trade liberalization proceeding
in a slow and haphazard fashion, MVES could be an important (if not the only) source
of export quotas, recognition as “special exporters” or similar privileges. By 1995/96, of
course, foreign trade interventionism had been greatly reduced (even if change in prac-
tice has tended to lag significantly behind change in formal rules), and MVES had lost
much of its former weight. Accordingly, the perks it could offer to its exporters’ asso-
ciations were also less attractive than in previous years. However, considerable benefits
remained. MVES, for instance, still had a network of foreign representative offices in
place, and access to those and their services would have been highly valuable. The same
was true of its potential role in gathering general market information. MVES had also
retained a role on the diplomatic level – in all likelihood it was due to MVES connec-
tions that Soiuz lesoeksporterov continued to participate in Russian delegations abroad.
Soiuz lesoeksporterov thus owed much of its survival to the Byzantine division of re-
sponsibilities among Russian government agencies. Export quotas are a case in point:
As outlined above, a 1993 inter-departmental agreement gave Roslesprom authority to
allocate timber export quotas. However, Roslesprom was not alone: Similar authority
rested with a veritable host of other agencies and office-holders both in the center and
the localities including, at one point, all members of the Russian cabinet (cf. Rahr, 1993:
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 “Sostav kollegii Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi lesopromyshlennoi kompanii Roslesprom,” Lesnaia
gazeta, February 9, 1995, p. 1.
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7). Similar examples can be found in other spheres. Soiuz lesoeksporterov, thus, in a
sense profited from the fragmented character of the Russian state itself. I will return to
this argument in the concluding section; the next pages, however, will be devoted to
further elaborating on the role of Roslesprom.
The Creation of Goskomlesprom
This section analyzes one specific episode, the short-lived creation of a State Committee
for the Timber Industry, or Goskomlesprom. Created in the run-up to the 1996 Russian
presidential elections, Goskomlesprom was not destined to reach a respectable old age:
Controversial even at the time of its foundation in June 1996, the organization was only
given a proper charter in September of the same year, only to be downgraded and inte-
grated into the Ministry of Economics in March of the following year. The episode
hence is interesting less for any practical and long-lasting policy implications, but for
what it tells us about the underlying relationships between actors – in particular center-
regional relations.
By late 1995, Roslesprom had reached an impasse. In the first three years of its exis-
tence, besides building up some fairly profitable commercial operations, it had success-
fully positioned itself at the center of public-private interaction in the timber industry.
However, by the end of those three years Roslesprom found itself increasingly frustrated
in its wider “system-building” ambitions. The attempt to remonopolize the industry by
creating encompassing holding companies had essentially failed. The campaign contin-
ued into spring 1996, when Roslesprom put forward suggestions for the formation of a
“Financial-Industrial Group” in the pulp and paper field, but it was not being pushed
forcefully anymore. Foreign trade liberalization robbed Roslesprom of a major lever
over enterprises since (at least as far as formal rules went) there now were no more
quotas to allocate. Even worse, as the country’s budgetary crisis dried up government
subsidy and loan programs, Roslesprom found its hold on industry lessening. Some of
the new commercial organizations, like Lesnoi bank, had been drawn into the Ros-
lesprom orbit because of its access to state funding; they now took a more detached
stance.18 On the production level, a few stronger producers (for example, Arkhangelsk-
based Solombal’skii LDK) treated the agency’s offers of assistance with increasing dis-
dain. Roslesprom attempted to extricate itself from these problems in an admirably re-
sourceful fashion, using its status as subcontractor on a U.S. Eximbank loan program
negotiated by the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission. In spring 1996, Roslesprom repre-
sentatives throughout Russia’s regions began soliciting additional export business for
Roseksportles, in return holding out promises of U.S. loans; however, interest in the
loan program remained low.
Public criticism of Roslesprom, its hybrid status and the resulting corruption was grow-
ing. By 1995, this had begun to go beyond specialized circles. Articles critical of Ros-
lesprom were appearing in the mainstream press. Even if Roslesprom tried to shrug this
off – its court newspaper, Lesnaia gazeta, dismissed the criticism as a concerted cam-
paign initiated by a few business opponents – surely in the long run the polemics threat-
ened to undermine the agency’s political standing. The status quo, thus, became ever
harder to sustain, yet no clear alternative was in sight. To be sure, Roslesprom had long
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  Stepanov (11/15/96) claimed that Lesnoi bank was now primarily working with independent traders
such as Eksportles.
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been pushing to be awarded official government status, all under the slogan of “restor-
ing governability.” But even with the support of some very high-placed government of-
ficials, those remained ritualistic appeals – pronounced at sectoral conferences and
printed in industry publications, yet failing to resonate with a wider public.
Then, very suddenly, the situation changed. On June 15, 1996, just days before the first
round of the presidential elections, Yeltsin signed a decree creating a State Committee
for the Timber Industry (Goskomlesprom). The old Roslesprom would de facto be split,
with regulatory tasks to be handled by the new State Committee headed by Tatsiun,
while the commercial subdivisions would be administered by a residual Roslesprom.
Even if this was not the ministerial status he had strived for, Tatsiun seemed to have ful-
filled his wildest aspirations. But why now?
As I have argued in the introduction, it is hard to pinpoint objective factors necessitating
this step at this time. A State Committee for the Timber Industry could have had a use-
ful role in 1992 and after; by 1996, with export liberalized, subsidies much reduced and
most enterprises at least formally privatized, the rationale for it had essentially disap-
peared. To be sure, one could argue that while Soviet-style central management is by
now obsolete, even in a market economy a certain need for regulation remains. This of
course is the raison d’etre for their organization that Goskomlesprom staff give offi-
cially, and most of the forty-two articles in the agency’s ustav outlining its new tasks do
indeed deal with regulation of some sort or other. In reality, however, “regulation” ar-
guments do not lead very far in this case. Intervention in matters such as foreign trade,
as already mentioned, had been much reduced (albeit not abolished completely). Re-
source and environmental regulation, on the other hand, could indeed provide a very
convincing rationale for government intervention in the sector, were it not for the fact
that those were already handled by a different agency, the Federal Forest Service (Ros-
leskhoz)19, with Goskomlesprom responsible only for forest industries proper.
In any event, even if one could make a convincing case in favor of government regula-
tion of the timber industry, from the available evidence Yeltsin’s team took a different
position on the issue. General policy trends in 1996 were once again sharply against
branch management agencies, and some of them, including the powerful Metallurgy
Committee, were merged into a resuscitated Industry Ministry in summer 1996. This
makes the creation of Goskomlesprom even more surprising, especially considering the
low weight the “Timber Industrial Complex” traditionally enjoyed in Soviet and post-
Soviet politics. The decision, moreover, remained extremely controversial even after the
decree was issued, and it was only a full three months later that Chernomyrdin’s gov-
ernment followed suit with the required resolution confirming the decree and assigning
its tasks to the new agency. The new committee, thus, had to surmount formidable ob-
stacles. The fact that it was formed anyway suggests that, in the eyes of the government,
such a step offered benefits outweighing the damage done to policy credibility. What
were those benefits? They were unlikely to lie in the future activities of Goskom-
lesprom. Two other interpretations are possible. The first of these would view Yeltsin’s
decree in the context of the negative publicity surrounding the old Roslesprom. Ros-
lesprom sleaze had become ever more prominent, and threatened to tarnish the govern-
ment itself. Back in 1995, a panel of lawyers probably commissioned by the govern-
ment (“Ekspertnoe zakliuchenie…” 1996) had examined Roslesprom’s hybrid status
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and found it to be unconstitutional. Splitting up Roslesprom’s commercial and public
functions was definitely on the agenda. However, this need not have entailed conferring
the coveted committee status on what was, in this interpretation, a discredited agency.
Other moving factors, as well, must have been behind the Yeltsin decree.
Electoral Politics and Regulatory Capture
Such an alternative explanation is provided easily by a look at the precise timing of the
decree which suggests efforts to please a constituency in the run-up to the presidential
elections. This was not an isolated event. A few weeks before the Goskomlesprom de-
cree another branch management organ, the State Committee for the Defense Industries
(Goskomoboronprom) had been upgraded to a ministry; analysts at the time attributed
this move to an attempt to strengthen Yeltsin’s position in defense industrial regions
like the Urals. Similarly, the first wave of branch committee creation in 1992 seems to
have been constituency–rather than policy-oriented (cf. Fortescue, 1997).
What is puzzling about 1996 are the discrepancies in policy toward different sectors.
While defense and timber industrial institutions were upgraded, others, as mentioned
above, were down-graded shortly after the elections. That being said, there can be no
doubt that winning support from the “Timber-Industrial Complex” was indeed a high
priority during the 1996 campaign. Yeltsin himself made campaign trips to both Ark-
hangelsk and Krasnoyarsk, both major timber industrial regions, visiting enterprises and
dispersing subsidies in the form of cheap loans. The Goskomlesprom decree, as well,
can be viewed in response to longstanding demands from the regions: As far back as
1994, the creation of a timber ministry had been a main demand of an open letter ad-
dressed to Yeltsin by the political leaders of several timber industrial regions. The elec-
toral perspective also accounts for the timing of further events. After the elections, Go-
skomlesprom unlike other committees was not merged into the Ministry of Industry –
possibly because gubernatorial elections were still ahead in many of these regions.20 In
contrast, the recent massive governmental reorganization could afford not to heed such
factors.
While the position of the government is thus easily explained, the very existence of a
constituency for the Goskomlesprom decree bears further exploration. That regions, or
enterprises in the regions, would lend their support to the restoration of central tutelage
is, after all, far from self-evident. Roslesprom, with its widely known corruption, was
far from popular down on the ground. At stake, besides, were not just regional (or firm)
autonomy, but the direction of central funding as well. Regional government officials
tend to resent branch-based funding programs for industry; based on what they claim is
their greater familiarity with the needs of local industry, they would much prefer to ad-
minister such funds themselves. Regions, thus, jealously guard their rights vis-à-vis
Moscow organs, yet at the same time extended support for Roslesprom, an otherwise
disliked and distrusted agency. This indicates that the role of central branch agencies
had changed. For all its rhetoric on “restoring governability” (a goal likely to be ap-
proved in theory, but resisted in practice), Roslesprom obviously was viewed less as a
regulator than as a potential advocate. Try as it might to get into certification, trade
regulation and other such issues, its real function seen from below was as an industry
                                                
20
 For example, gubernatorial elections in December 1996 in Arkhangelsk ended with the victory of the
incumbent, a Yeltsin appointee.
45
mouthpiece in Moscow: somebody to talk tough with the railroads in an attempt to
lower ruinous rail tariffs; to lobby tax exemptions; to advocate rouble devaluation. In
sum, Roslesprom, first and foremost, had come to be a pressure group inside govern-
ment. This, obviously, is not to say it always or even mostly succeeded in this task, yet
it may very well play a useful role in many individual cases.
Conclusion: Institutionalized Uncertainty and
Particularistic Problem-Solving
This sections returns to the three scenarios proposed in the introduction. In as concise a
form as possible, it will summarize the evidence pro and contra the different scenarios
outlined above. As I shall argue, careful examination shows that certain elements of all
three scenarios exist, but in no case sufficiently strongly to show a genuine pattern. I
will then go on to propose an alternative interpretation.
The Inertia Scenario
I will begin by discussing the institutional inertia/path dependency scenario. The timber
industry is an unusually good case for refuting this argument. Up to 1991, ministerial
structures were slow in responding to calls (often from above) for institutional reform.
This changed radically in 1992 with the arrival of the Yeltsin administration. Within a
few months, branch administrative structures collapsed almost completely (different
from many other industries which at least on the surface managed to preserve parts of
the apparatus). Rather than fighting for the preservation of the status quo, former high
ministerial staff began setting up organizations of their own – mostly in the form of
joint-stock companies, but also different non-profits such as “social organizations”
(obshchestvennye organizatsii) and business associations. However, these initial moves
towards the emergence of market-based governance structures soon gave way to a grad-
ual reestablishment of central branch administration through the back door. In late 1992,
a state-owned company called Roslesprom was set up for the ostensible purpose of co-
ordinating research funding in the timber sector. This humble function soon became
secondary as the company was transferred one regulatory task after another, and within
less than a year Roslesprom found itself handling governmental responsibilities such as
the allocation of preferential government loans and export quota. Simultaneously, it
sought to expand its commercial operations, often through subsidiaries acquired by ex-
ploiting its gatekeeper role. This remarkable rise to prominence culminated during the
1996 presidential campaign with the formation of a “state committee” for the timber
industry, based on the former Roslesprom.
This sequence of events contradicts the “inertia” scenario in that there was no direct or-
ganizational continuity between the former Minlesprom and Roslesprom. Staff disconti-
nuity was significant at both top and lower levels; Roslesprom’s chairman Miron
Tatsiun – a young man in his mid-thirties at the time of his initial appointment – lacked
prior nomenklatura experience but compensated for this with substantial political skill.
Roslesprom was not created as a regulatory agency; rather, it gradually grew into this
role. As I will argue, Roslesprom’s rise was to a large extent driven by demand from
below, i.e., from timber-producing regions and large enterprises; the organization’s
leadership skillfully exploited this demand in a prime example of political entrepre-
neurhip. In spite of such successes, however, Roslesprom did not perform the same role
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as a Soviet ministry, and its ambitious plan to resuscitate Soviet-style integrated re-
gional production complexes failed dismally. Center-regional relations little resembled
those under the old regime; while dependent on Roslesprom for certain resources, re-
gions acted both as clients and sponsors of the organization, and regional representa-
tives occupied prominent places on the Roslesprom board (kollegiia). As to the federal
level, Roslesprom did indeed achieve quite a powerful position, but fell short of mo-
nopolizing control. Attempts to take over competing organizations were only partially
successful.
The Market Scenario
While “inertia” arguments can thus be discounted, neither is the timber industry’s tra-
jectory summarized adequately in terms of a transition to market democracy. Above,
admittedly, I have used just such terminology to describe the 1992 start-ups. And in-
deed, ministerial successor organizations do perform certain intermediary services (e.g.,
supplying hitherto centralized information, transport services, etc.) that may be inter-
preted as necessary to the emergence of a market infrastructure: Knowledge of global
markets, for instance, had in Soviet times been dismally low even among top-level en-
terprise management. The mere fact that such intermediaries are run by ex-apparatchiki
does not automatically disqualify them as genuine market actors – always provided that
there is, indeed, a new logic to interorganizational relationships necessitating a depar-
ture from old operating procedures. Precisely this, however, is questionable in this case.
Rather than using superior knowledge, the new “market” organizations are mainly based
on the old Soviet skills of exploiting informal relationships and their former or con-
tinuing insider status vis-à-vis different parts of the state apparatus. For example, the
fact that many enterprises continue to depend on Moscow-based trade intermediaries for
their exports has less to do with the latters’ superior marketing skills than with the fact
that physical transport is extraordinarily hard to arrange without some sort of direct or-
ganizational interlock with port authorities – partial ownership or the creation of joint
ventures. (Significantly, timber enterprises in a port city like Arkhangelsk, many of
whom possess their own loading facilities on the Dvina river, are characterized by a
much higher degree of marketization than their Siberian competitors). As to the Ros-
lesprom story outlined above, as my analysis will show this reemergence of branch ad-
ministration had little to do with the regulatory requirements of a market economy. The
1996 creation of a state committee in particular, was motivated not by functional con-
siderations, but as an election gesture to win over Roslesprom’s constituency in the re-
gions.
The Regionalist Scenario
To finally turn to the regionalist scenario: There are, certainly, regional fiefdoms in to-
day’s Russia, but their strength varies substantially across regions. Furthermore, their
influence is at least partially derived from circumstances other than those described
above. In the model, regional fiefdoms are based on their considerable degree of control
over local resources. This makes a great deal of sense, but it is not the whole story: As
far as timber-producing regions are concerned, it seems that regional governments enjoy
their greatest degree of control over producers precisely in those parts of Russia that
also, for geographical and infrastructural reasons, depend most on post-ministerial in-
termediaries. Above I have described transport problems typically encountered by en-
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terprises in foreign or interregional trade, and the role of Moscow intermediaries in
coping with these problems. Such chains of intermediation often include regional gov-
ernments acting as negotiators vis-à-vis Moscow entities or other regional authorities
and, once agreements have been reached, also as guarantors (thus compensating for the
weaknesses of contract enforcement). This means the influence of regional administra-
tions is at least partly due to the dependence of the region as a whole on Moscow-based
resources. It also explains why timber regions, in the Goskomlesprom episode, lobbied
for a restoration of central branch administration. Aspects such as these can only be
adequately captured by a perspective on the level of the nation-state, rather than of se-
lected regions.
Particularistic Policy Patterns and the Corruption of Formal Organization
Such a nation-level description, however, is a task fraught with complexities. In fact, the
most striking feature of the Russian timber industry today is the extraordinary fuzziness
and fluidity of its organizational structures. As I have outlined, attempts at consolidation
met with only limited success. In spite of Roslesprom’s best efforts, the observer is con-
fronted with a fragmented field composed of a bewildering multitude of organizations –
most of them spin-offs from different administrative or research bodies. Many of these
bodies are small and easy to caricature as insignificant: As one Western analyst (Kubi-
cek, 1996: 35) quipped in reference to Ukrainian business associations, “many ‘groups’
appear to be no more than a former apparatchik, a secretary and a fax machine.”  Such a
reaction is apt, but it does not do complete justice to the situation; spin-offs cannot be
dismissed quite as easily. The fact that – in spite of their fragmentation and lack of in-
fluence on policy-making – so many of them have survived is notable.
The phenomenon, then, is for real, yet it is hard to discern structure in it. In the context
of modern industrial societies one would normally expect to find differentiation by
tasks, membership basis or other criteria, the most basic being such distinctions as “pri-
vate” or “public,” “commercial” or “non-profit.” All of these are highly dubious in this
case, and official labels that a particular organization has taken on – such as that of
“joint stock company” as opposed to “association” – are no great help. Officially, the
spin-offs form a diverse population of very Western-sounding bodies: They all – or so it
would seem on the surface – have carved out their own little niches enabling them to
survive under the new market logic governing the industry. In fact, though, underneath
the fancy labels are very similar activities and even organizational forms. Governmental
bodies engage in private-sector entrepreneurship. Ostensible non-profits such as busi-
ness associations moonlight as consultants and representatives for foreign firms. In
short, many familiar distinctions in the post-Soviet context become rather spurious.
Neither is it easy to construct such distinctions empirically by analyzing and comparing
the main functions of different organizations, as there is a great degree of overlap and
competition for the same tasks. Internal structures, as well, are often very similar:
Whether “private” or “public,” “commercial” or “non-profit,” most of the new entities
rely on a regional basis of “members,” “founders,” or shareholders; in other cases, such
as Roslesprom’s, prominent regional representatives act as board members. Finally –
and this is a crucial factor – the regional clienteles of different Moscow timber organi-
zations overlap to a very high extent. Over and over again, membership or board lists
show the same names, mainly those of big regional conglomerates and trading firms.
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This leads me back to the three scenarios proposed originally. As the discussion has
shown, elements from several of them can indeed be found; however, none of the sce-
narios is fully borne out by the empirical evidence. Central branch bodies have not sur-
vived thanks to their collective survival interest; rather, a modified form of branch ad-
ministration was temporarily resurrected due to a combination of individual political
entrepreneurship and demands from the regions. Commercial intermediaries appropriate
to a market environment have emerged, but to a large extent they operate in a political,
rather than economic market. The impersonality characteristic of genuine market
mechanisms is largely lacking; neither, on the either hand, are there many signs of
genuine collective action. As to decentralization and the role of the regions, undoubt-
edly much power has devolved to the provincial level, yet Moscow-based organizations
continue to play a vital role. Actors, it almost seems, play with different varieties of
formal organization. Organizational principles are borrowed from a variety of contexts:
the old command economy and its emphasis on unity and “branch patriotism”; Western
economics textbooks; finally, the ideology of regional self-determination. However, lit-
tle of this goes beyond labels and official rhetoric. Indeed, those formal principles have
little chance of operating on a deeper level. Much as state socialism in its late years,
formal organization has been subverted from within through the widespread pursuit of
particularistic strategies on all levels of the hierarchy. In empirical reality, strong insti-
tutions are sacrificed; instead of stable expectations, actors thus gain a multiplication of
channels through which to pursue individualistic goals. Hence, even purportedly collec-
tive organizations, such as business associations, in practice are mainly engaged in vari-
ous sorts of brokerage, rather than genuinely collective action. The significance of such
patterns is hard to overestimate.
Regulatory Background and Outlook
The explanation for the predominance of particularistic patterns among Russian political
and economic actors, I contend, has to be sought in the macro-institutions of society, or
differently put, in an organizational environment that is itself characterized by fluidity
and unpredictability. Implementation is neglected; often new legislation is passed with-
out accompanying administrative guidelines to govern its application, without estab-
lishing proper monitoring procedures and without specifying sanctions for noncompli-
ance. The regulatory framework itself is piecemeal, inconsistent, and often simply
lacking. This means that regulatory and allocative decisions are rarely subject to formal
rules, but – as in Soviet times – taken on a case-by-case basis. Under these circum-
stances, attempts at collective action become all but meaningless. Even if actors succeed
in overcoming their collective action problems for the sake of some common goal –
such as government assistance for the industry or favorable legislation – the pervasive
regulatory problems mean that even a successful outcome may be of little practical
benefit to anyone. To give just one example: The federal government has for years sys-
tematically ignored and underfulfilled the expenditures side of the federal budget,
thereby creating a situation in which allocation decisions are made on a completely ad
hoc basis by the Ministry of Finance or the presidential administration itself. In conse-
quence, although there is an ongoing surface battle in the Duma that aims to increase
budgetary assistance to the timber industry, in practice any such demands are doomed
from the outset. Instead, enterprises are forced to resort to various alternative channels
(Roslesprom, competing organizations, regional administrations, etc.) in order to influ-
ence policy implementation in their own particular case. The result is traditional Soviet-
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style “corridor politics”: individual claimants woo individual officials in agencies such
as the Ministry of Finance, the Tax Commission, or others. The success of this, obvi-
ously, depends largely on personal connections. Multiple membership hence becomes a
rational hedging strategy from the point of view of members. As to the Moscow-based
intermediators themselves, it also means that there is no particular incentive for them to
consolidate; fragmentation can be expected to continue in the medium to long term.
If particularistic strategies are, as I have claimed, caused by deficiencies in the macro-
institutions, then any attempts at long-term prediction depend largely on what it was that
caused those deficiencies in the first place. Above I have given a descriptive account
that so far stops short of offering any more detailed explanations. Two different ap-
proaches to this are conceivable. Regulatory problems may have been caused by the up-
heavals of post-communist transition. Much evidence points in this direction. The de-
mise of the Communist Party, for so long the unchallenged authority in the country, has
left a power vacuum that has only partially been filled by the new democratic institu-
tions; this has helped the rise of organized crime. Low-paid officials have every incen-
tive to overlook infractions – for a price; the more confusing the regulatory jungle, the
better for them, and if there are no appropriate rules the victim can be accused of vio-
lating, they can always be made up. Transition from the socialist fiscal system to one
adequate to a market economy has not yet been accomplished: hence the budget short-
falls that may have made cash flow budgeting practices all but unavoidable. Much new
legislation yet remains to be written; at the same time the new Russian constitution has
introduced a new set of problems by making president and parliament equally ranked
sources of legislation, thus preventing the constitutional court from resolving the fre-
quent contradictions between them. But for all that, such undeniable transitional prob-
lems make it all too easy to overlook how endemic regulatory problems have been in
the longue duree of Russian history. To take just one example, Russian law faced prob-
lems of hierarchy centuries before the new post-Soviet constitution and continuing
through the Soviet period. Cash flow budgeting practices – another example – may be
inseparable from the present fiscal crisis, but they are also deeply rooted in Soviet plan-
ning practices which maintained Five-Year-Plans as a “rationality ritual” while actual
resources were allocated not according to plan but to priority lists maintained by central
planners. On a more abstract level, ultimately today’s lack of stable macro-institutions
may have much to do with the fact that a Weberian rational state never became reality in
Russia. Numerous studies of the tsarist period have pointed out the difficulties of insti-
tution-building in “undergoverned Russia.” Under Bolshevik rule, of course, the state’s
coercive capacities were vastly extended, but again at the expense of procedural ration-
ality which both in theory and practice was subordinated to mobilizational goals.
What outlook, then, for the future? As this analysis shows, particularistic strategies have
become the only viable option open to individuals and organizations. The implications
from this for policymaking are dire. Given the widespread pressures for individual rule
adjustments, policy implementation from above is unlikely to become any more consis-
tent – witness the repeated decrees issuing from the presidential administration which
do little other than rehash previous decrees. Neither is self-governance through non-
state collective actors a viable option. Some Western observers have taken phenomena
such as the federal Tripartite Commission as grounds to suggest an emergence of a neo-
corporatist political economy in Russia – with all the positive side effects, such as so-
cietal stability, that have been associated with similar policy-making structures in the
West. Unfortunately, such an interpretation misses the basic character of the Russian
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political system: In complete contrast to corporatist systems, Russian-style organiza-
tional multiplication and hedging strategies mean that none of the overarching organi-
zations will be able to reach binding agreements on behalf of their members; compro-
mise, thus, is discouraged. This leaves small-scale reform attempts on a regional level as
the most realistic option.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Attitudinal Diversity through
Q-analysis – an Illustration of a Research
Approach
Olga Mashkina
The Siberian forest market is experiencing many difficulties in connection with the tran-
sition from a Soviet type command economy to a more market oriented system. There
are problems of shortages due to consumers’ limited ability to pay, monopoly prices,
lack of information, existing government policies and the new forest legislation. This
paper presents the results of an attempt to illustrate how an analysis of managers’ atti-
tudes to the problems besetting the Siberian forest markets might be conducted. In a
time of profound and fast structural economic change analyzing key actors’ attitudes to
the change process is important. The purpose of such a study would be to identify the
problems of the forest markets in some Siberian regions and investigate managers’ atti-
tudes towards these problems. This could be done through interviews with managers in
the forest sector.
The present study outlines a design of a Q-methodological analysis of interview data
that would be possible to use to identify the types of attitudes that prevail among the Si-
berian forest enterprise managers. The paper indicates a way of conducting such a study
and illustrates in what way Q-analysis could provide conclusions that would be impos-
sible to obtain through more conventional methods of statistical analysis. It should be
emphasized that this is a pilot study intended to illustrate a scientific approach. Further
studies based on a proper sample of respondents are necessary to provide reliable re-
sults.
The Problem
The Russian Federation accounts for more than 22% of the world’s forested area, and
60% of all boreal forests. Until recently, Russia was second in the world in timber pro-
duction, surpassed only by the United States. Timber production provided 3% of the
GNP and it employed about two million people (FAO, 1996). During the transition pe-
riod from a command economy to a market-oriented economy when market relations
are being established and profound institutional changes are required, the Russian forest
sector will have to overcome many difficult problems.
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During the period 1989–1993 both production and consumption of forest products fell
sharply in Russia. By 1995, the decrease of production began to slow down and for
many forest products the production in 1996 was only 80% compared to the previous
year (Backman & Blam, 1997). Employment in the forest industry has fallen. However,
it never fell as steeply as physical output. A significant share of production in the Rus-
sian forest sector depended upon the export markets. Up to 14% of roundwood, 21% of
lumber, 18% of panel, 21% of paper and 13% of pulp production was exported in 1990
(Backman & Blam, 1997). By 1993, many of the external markets (mostly in the “near
abroad” countries and in the Baltics) collapsed leaving Russian producers with less than
half of their traditional markets. However, by 1994, the “Far Abroad” markets again
took an interest in Russian forest products and, despite the decline in the traditional
markets, net exports amounted to nearly one-third of the wood supply (Lesnaia gazeta
21, 1997). Japanese, American, and other trading companies are seeking to expand their
operations into the new regions as the demand for logs begins to grow (Taiga-News,
1995). The potential demand for lumber in Asian markets alone is tremendous. FAO
projects that both China and Japan will remain net importers of wood products and that
the Russian Federation could be one of the top global suppliers. (FAO, 1995). The de-
mand for birch wood is increasing, especially in the countries of Northern Europe. The
price of cellulose and cardboard is rising as well. All these factors can create positive
long-term perspectives for the export of Russian forest products (Lesnaia gazeta 21,
1997).
Furthermore, prospects are becoming increasingly favorable for Siberian forest products
because of the falling demand for tropical timber (FAO, 1996). Russia’s “near-abroad”
countries are only able to satisfy some 20% of their demand for forest products through
their own resources (Lesnaia gazeta 21, 1997). In 1990, the world deficit in forest raw
materials amounted to between 60 and 80 million cubic meters and it is continuously
increasing (Lesnaia gazeta, 1995). According to the FAO forecasts to the year 2010 an-
nual average consumption growth rates may be 1.4-1.6%. The world production (ac-
cording to FAO) may increase by 1.8% per year till the year 2000. However, according
to other estimates (World Bank, IIASA and SRI) production growth rates will be more
moderate, between 1.1-1.2% annually (Sedjio, 1990: 177). So, the demand for timber
and other forest products might not be completely satisfied through the expected supply.
According to the World Resource Institute increased demand for raw logs together with
a declining supply in other parts of the world will continue to exert pressure to harvest
the forests of Siberian and the Russian Far East (World Resources, 1996).
Siberia possesses about half of all Russia’s forests. It is, therefore, an urgent task to in-
vestigate the realism of the prospects for Siberia to ease this demand problem while at
the same time achieve a sustainable development of its forest sector.
Such an investigation is, of course, a demanding task requiring a careful study of the
existing market situation and the institutions regulating its functioning, as well as social
and environmental consequences of policies aimed at modernizing the sector and in-
creasing its marketable output. The transition entails profound value and attitude
changes in society accompanying the large structural changes in the economy. Thus, a
focus on attitude changes among the actors of the system in transformation seems well
warranted since the ultimate success of the transition, which Russia is currently going
through, is closely dependent upon people’s ability to change their values and attitudes.
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Market investigations can be focused on qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of the
behavior of enterprises and their customers. In the specific case of Siberia it is, how-
ever, often difficult to obtain true and reliable statistics about the market situation for
Siberian forest products. Therefore, qualitative research of important actors’ attitudes
might contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of the Siberian forest mar-
kets. However, there are several peculiarities in conducting market attitude research in
Russia compared to the situation in a developed western market economy. To some ex-
tent this is due to differences in actors’ psychology and their long exposure to a political
system favoring partly different behavior compared to what is normal in most western
industrialized countries. (During Soviet times researchers doing qualitative research of
people’s attitudes had problems finding any diversity in the answers since everyone was
expected to think the same.) Answers given by respondents to various questionnaires or
interviews often did not, in fact, reveal what people really thought (this might especially
be true about the opinions of enterprise managers) but rather what was considered by
current ideology to be politically correct or what respondents believed best served their
own future interests. Qualitative research is becoming a much stronger tool now when
the old rules are changing and democracy is allowing people to think individually.
However, for many people, especially the older generation, it is still hard to change the
way they used to work all their life.
Thus, a basic problem for attitudinal research in the current Russian setting is to under-
stand what people really think and whom they blame for the existing problems. It is
very important to look at the diversity of opinions, to identify areas of common opinions
and attitudes, as well as areas of conflict. Since all citizens participate in the process of
transition in their capacity of consumers and producers it is essential to look at their
subjective attitudes towards the emerging market mechanism. Their viewpoints and at-
titudes toward the current problems are important for a better understanding of the com-
plex situation. Such a study should be useful in a management as well as a policy per-
spective.
During the transition period when the situation has become more complicated managers
tend to put the blame on some external factor rather than on themselves, often causing
misunderstandings in their work. As a result, some policies that might otherwise have
been successfully implemented, fail because of conflicting attitudes among enterprise
managers.
Goals and Objectives
To serve existing and to explore new markets is the most difficult challenge for manag-
ers during the transition period. Interesting insight into how this challenge is being met
by enterprise managers in different subsectors of the forest sector and in different re-
gions might be gained through attitude research. Using existing qualitative data is not
viable for reasons already mentioned above. It can be expected that rules and laws dur-
ing a transition period, like the one Russia is currently going through, play a compara-
tively less significant role than they do under normal market circumstances. Attitudes
and opinions of economic agents (like enterprise managers) can be expected to play a
correspondingly greater role for the performance of the system. Since existing qualita-
tive data on the attitudes and opinions of enterprise managers are difficult to obtain and
generically unreliable we have performed a questionnaire based attitudinal study of for-
est sector managers in four different regions of Siberia.
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The data thus acquired were analyzed using the “Q-methodology,” a widely used atti-
tude research tool that allows a relatively simple data collection. The Q-methodology
accomplishes a grouping of people according to their attitudes, in our case their attitudes
towards forest policy and management. It enables the identification of conflict areas and
can point out directions for their solutions. Q-methodology has been successfully used
in the area of psychology and political science and it has been tested under varying con-
ditions in different countries like the U.S., Mexico, Brazil and Australia. The factor
analytical techniques of Q-methodology provides a mechanism through which attitudes
might be factored even when respondents have not explicitly revealed his/her true
opinions.
The specific goals of the pilot study are:
• To examine the principal theoretical possibility of utilizing Q-methodology for the
analysis of enterprise managers’ attitudes towards the market system which is cur-
rently being developed in Russia.
• To analyze the results of a relatively small number of interviews conducted with
forest enterprise managers in Siberia with the help of Q-methodology.
• To provide suggestions for further studies of Siberian managers’ attitudes towards
the market using Q-methodology.
Methodology
Since this whole study of managers’ attitudes is designed to be analyzed with the help
of Q-methodology we will start out with a brief outline of the most important principles
of the methodology. After that we will describe in more detail how the study was con-
ducted.
As has been emphasized the Q-methodology has been widely used in the social sci-
ences. More than 1,500 bibliographic entries contain the key words relating to Q-
methodology (Brown, 1986). The investigation of Siberian forest markets and manage-
ment practices that is set out to be done here is based on a study of personal attitudes
towards problems, issues, and polices related to the Russian forest sector. The data for
the analysis was gathered through a series of interviews during which the respondents
(forest enterprise managers) disclosed their opinions towards a series of statements ex-
pressing specific views on various market issues and forest sector problems as well as
forest sector policies. With the help of Q-methodology it was then possible to discern
certain “attitudinal patterns” in the interview data.
In the “Q-process” individuals (respondents) are asked to sort statements expressing an
attitude or opinion into a continuum of categories reflecting the extent to which they
agree or disagree with that statement. As Brown (1986) puts it: “Only subjective opin-
ions are at issue in Q, and although they are typically unprovable, they can nevertheless
be shown to have a structure and form, and it is the task of q-technique to make this
form manifest for purposes of observation and study.”
The opinions of managers working in Siberian forest markets are entirely subjective,
like those of any other person. Nevertheless their attitudes might display a pattern or a
structure. Q-methodology has been used to analyze data generated by a small number of
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respondents and in-depth studies of a single case are quite common (McKeown, 1987).
Thus, this aspect of the methodology makes it very convenient for a study like this one,
where information is difficult to obtain. Even with a small sample (if it is representa-
tive) it is possible to generate a very precise picture.
In the works of Stephenson (1953) and Brown (1968) the philosophical, psychological
and political aspects of Q-methodology are discussed. Numerous examples of the use of
Q-methodology in political science and psychology are presented together with a com-
plete description of the investigation process. The implementation of Q-methodology in
different areas, including policy making and behavioral studies (Slovic, 1987), has
shown that populations can be grouped according to their attitudes towards a certain
subject. For example, studies have been made of Brazilians’ attitudes towards agrarian
reform, people’s perception of linkages among environmental quality, economic devel-
opment and local social policy, etc. (Peritore, 1990 and Clarke et al., 1990). Q-
methodology studies have often been used in areas where available quantitative data
could not explain a certain phenomenon. For example, in Kurtz et al. (1988), Q-
methodology was used to identify types of private non-industrial forest managers, and
why they utilize their forests in the way they do. Durning and Osuna (1994) used Q-
methodology to examine policy analysts’ roles in creating a policy, and so on.
In all of these studies people’s attitudes towards a subject were analyzed and a structure
of latent opinions were found. Applying Q-analysis to the study of Siberian forest mar-
kets may provide information that is not possible to obtain in any other way. This appli-
cation of Q-analysis might provide an identification and explanation of the problems
and the background of some of the conflicting issues that prevail in the sector.
Data Collection
The purpose of the study is to investigate Russian forest enterprise managers’ attitudes
towards the market. Since the “population” to be studied consists of all forest enterprise
managers in Siberia a suitable sample from that population must be selected for inter-
views. Then a number of statements should be derived that express specific opinions or
attitudes towards various features of the emerging Russian market system. Statements
should not be unnecessarily lengthy and they should clearly reflect a specific view (at-
titude, opinion) about the emerging Russian market system. Respondents are asked to
rank each statement according to his/her opinion. Ranking is usually done with the help
of card sorting or scales which measure the respondent’s degree of support for the re-
spective statements. The data obtained through these interviews is then run through a
factor analysis, which provides results identifying groups of similar views about the
various statements belonging to the set.
The set of statements is derived in order to collect the most marginal and opposite
opinions on the subject. However, it is very important that diversified opinions are ob-
tained. Thus, only issues that are controversial or problematic in some respect should be
included in the set of statements. In the literature reporting on research in which Q-
methodology has been used, the number of statements usually does not exceed 70.
In order to derive a set of statements, pilot interviews were conducted in the form of a
free conversation with several employees engaged in the Forest Management (Uprav-
lenie Lesnym Khoziaistvom) in Novosibirsk. Twenty-three statements1 were derived
                                                
1
  A complete listing is found in Appendix 1.
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based on the conversations with these people (managers and policy makers) who are
responsible for different aspects of the regional forest management.
The goal of this exercise was to identify the most pertinent problems relating to the for-
est products markets and to rank them in order of priority. Obviously, different manag-
ers and policy makers tend to put different priority on the main problems relating to the
current market situation. Those problems where opinions differed the most were se-
lected to be included in the set of Q-sort statements.
Examples of statements that were included in the set of Q-sort statements include:
• If forest enterprises used more qualified labor they would perform much better on
the market.
• The fact that prices for forest products are too high causes a decrease in consump-
tion.
• Use of forest products substitutes cause additional decrease in consumption.
• Competition with foreign producers causes a weak demand for Russian forest prod-
ucts.
• The statistical data on forest product trade contain less than 30% of all information
on the trade volumes which are actually traded.2
• Non-wood products constitute less than 5% of total forest industry consumption.
• The change in the ownership has significantly changed the volumes of forest sector
production and trade.
• Production activities are well regulated through existing legislation.
The interviews were held in the Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Kemerovo, and Gorno-Altai re-
gions in Siberia. Initially, data collection was supposed to be made in several Siberian
regions in order to have input from different climatic, forest and socio-economic condi-
tions. However, when the pilot interviews were conducted, it became clear that it would
not be feasible to make such a broad study. Presumably, due to the specific “Russian
psychology” as well as to the existing power structures, it is practically impossible to set
up appointments with the “right” people and conduct the interviews strictly in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Q-methodology. To be able to arrange an interview,
especially when it deals with attitudinal measurements, it is absolutely necessary to
have the “right” approach to the respondents. It is practically impossible to come in
from the outside and arrange such interviews without knowing someone inside the or-
ganizational or management structure.
After several unsuccessful attempts to find managers who would agree to be inter-
viewed, 3-5 persons were finally found in the Novosibirsk Forest Management (Uprav-
lenie Lesnym Khoziaistvom). However, as it appeared later, two of them refused to par-
ticipate after they found out what the interview was about. Fortunately, the law of “con-
nections” helped and I managed to meet with a person in Novosibirsk as well as to in-
                                                
2
  In its original wording this statement provoked very diversified and aggressive reactions during the pilot
interviews so it was rephrased to its present form.
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terview several people from Tomsk and Kemerovo. One interview was conducted with
a manager from the Gorno-Altai region during his participation in a research meeting in
Novosibirsk.
The size of the sample, therefore, is one person from each region. This is of course a
rather small sample. However, Q-methodology is known to provide precise results al-
though the number of respondents is not very large. The important thing is to have di-
versity in people and opinions. For the purpose of the present study the sample is suffi-
cient to analyze the applicability of the methodology and to obtain tentative results.
The original Q-methodology procedure requires the sorting of cards containing the
statements which the respondent should sort in accordance with his/her attitudes. The
pilot study revealed that Russian respondents were likely to refuse to participate in such
a procedure and, in addition, it is time consuming. Thus, the procedure was modified to
the conventional type of “questionnaire” (which the majority of Russian managers are
accustomed to) and the data collection took the form of an interview based on this
questionnaire.
In the Russian literature, different approaches have been defined in order to succeed in
sociological research like this. After having consulted sociologists from the Institute of
Economics (Dr. Cheremisina), questionnaires were finally designed to include questions
on statistics for enterprises as well as the attitude measurement statements. The statistics
for enterprises were collected to provide a basis for analyzing the result of Q-
methodology as well as for updating the database.
The respondents were asked to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the
respective statements about the functioning of markets. The answers were recorded on a
scale ranging from -3 – 3, where the negative number indicated complete disagreement
and the positive complete agreement, while zero indicates a neutral attitude to the
statement. This gives a scale with seven positions to represent the opinion of the re-
spondent.
Implementation of Q-methodology – Factor Analysis
The factor analysis required by the Q-Methodology is conveniently performed with
software specifically designed for the purpose by Atkinson (1992).3 Once the statements
and the attitude ranges have been entered, the user selects the correlation option for the
factor analysis, centroid factoring or principal component analysis. In the next step a
manual or a varimax rotation is performed. The last routine is the actual analysis, which
provides a text file containing a report of the analysis of the data entered.
One of the requirements for Q-analysis is that data on each respondent is normally dis-
tributed to obtain a cardinal ranking between the statements (Brown, 1968). To collect
the data for Q-methodology, all 23 statements were distributed normally for each re-
spondent, as shown in Fig.1.
                                                
3
  A description of the program can be found in Appendix IX.
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CATEGORIES
most disagree neutral most agree
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 ____________________________________________
number of statements in each category
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Figure 1: Normal distribution of the Q-sort
When each respondent’s normally distributed recorded “degree of agreement” with the
various statements in the set has been fed into the computer program the actual factor
analysis procedure can begin.
Factor analysis has been used as a procedure for studying the relations between the at-
tributes characterizing the object of investigation (the so-called “R method”). The cor-
relation and factoring of persons (the so-called “Q-method”) is based on factor theory,
but has become a separate methodology.4
A factor analysis entails several steps. Initially, all variables in the analysis are normal-
ized and then a covariance matrix is calculated between the variables. The resulting
matrix is called the unrotated matrix.5
In order to understand the identification of factors, it is necessary to examine the rela-
tionship between the number of common factors and the independent dimensions of the
resulting correlation matrix. The examination of the relationship is made by using the
different ranks of the matrix (which depend on the number of factors). In general, this
means that by examining the correlation matrix it is possible to identify a number of
common factors.
However, at this junction a problem may occur since the same covariance structure may
be created by different causal structures. For example, the same number of factors may
be caused by different loadings, or by a different number of common qualities. In order
                                                
4
  Some studies erroneously consider the Q-method as the transpose of the R-matrix. It is true only under a
condition of universality (units are common for both rows and columns).
5
  Any variable can be represented as a linear combination of an unknown common source and an inde-
pendent source. According to theorems in variance analysis the combination can be broken down into the
variance of dependent and independent sources respectively. There are a number of basic factor models
defined through the number of factors and the relationships between those factors.
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to solve this problem rotation of the factors should be used. This does not change the
position of the data in space; it merely affects the coefficients present in the original
matrix.6
The obtained matrix is called the rotated factor matrix, the columns of which indicate
the actual number of factors. The coefficients in the matrix are termed factor loadings
and reflect the extent to which a person relates to or represents a factor (in our case a Q-
statement). Higher individual loadings on a particular factor provide more characteris-
tics for identifying typologies. It is important to distinguish which loadings are signifi-
cant. In the literature the standard error is used to set the significance level, although
there is no one acceptable rule for its calculation.
Results and Discussion
In the present study factor loadings were at the level of 0.8. Table 1 summarizes the re-
sults of the calculations.
Table 1: The results of the Q-analysis, factors and factor loadings.
 Factor Matrix With an X Indicating a Defining Factor
Loadings
 QSORT 1 2
1 Novosibirsk -.1759 .8701X
2 Tomsk .4584 .7610X
3 Gorno-al .8393X -.1999
4 Kemerovo .8199X .3284
 % expl. Var 40 37
As can be seen in Table 1, two factors seem to capture some underlying common atti-
tude. Further analysis of the factor loadings reveals that individuals with high loadings
on one factor are usually highly covariated. Low loadings on the factor indicate that the
factor is insignificant or weak and should be neglected.
In Q-methodology, description of types is done with the help of a so-called factor array
representation, which describes the importance of each statement to each individual.
The factor array gives the “ideal Q-sort” for a type and shows which of the statements
                                                
6
  Normally orthogonal or oblique rotation is used (Kim & Mueller, 1978).
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contributed the least or the most to the formation of the type. These can be seen in Ap-
pendix V.
Description of the Main Types
Two dominant factors were obtained through the Q-analysis that was performed on the
data. By studying the factor arrays (see Appendix IV) we found that the attitudes fa-
vored by those respondents mainly contributing to the first factor might warrant them
the label “demand accusers,” the group of respondents building the second pertinent
factor might be labeled “realistic entrepreneurs.” In this section we briefly summarize
the characteristics of the two entrepreneurial “types” that are indicated by the respective
factors.
TYPE I:  “DEMAND ACCUSERS”
Representatives of this type strongly believe that the weak domestic (intra-region) de-
mand has caused the main problems for the Siberian forest enterprises. Consequently,
the absence of public (government) demand (goszakaz) is seen as an obstacle for suc-
cessful business activities.
The representatives of this type also believe that forest products are highly overpriced, a
fact that creates a misbalance and depresses demand.
Respondents from the Gorno-Altai and Kemerovo regions grouped to form the first type
– “demand accusers.” For this type, domestic (intra-region) demand and governmental
demand is important. If sufficiently large, this demand would provide for a normal
functioning of the markets in the region, implicitly implying that tariffs and financial
systems would be relatively unimportant for the functioning of the market. This type
was labeled “demand accusers” also because they put strong emphasis on demand
rather than on prices or the quality of the wood products, marketing services, wood sub-
stitutes and transportation. Consumer insolvency is not assumed to be a very important
reason for the current market problems.
The “demand accusers” blame their problems on difficulties obtaining financial credits,
rather than blaming the high interest rates. This can be explained by the fact that in the
Gorno-Altai and Kemerovo regions there are significantly fewer financial institutions
and foreign funding operations, and business services.
Managers in the first group do not rely much on existing marketing services and believe
that their disappearance would not slow down the development of the forest product
markets. Respondents of the “demand accuser” type do not consider transport tariffs to
be an essential problem for the development of their enterprises.
The “demand accusers” type does not believe that wood substitutes exert any strong
influence on the markets for forest products. Barter trade and consumer insolvency are
not the main problems of the markets according to this type.
TYPE II – “REALISTIC ENTREPRENEURS”
In our pilot study representatives of the “realistic entrepreneurs” type of manager were
mainly to be found in the Novosibirsk and Tomsk regions.
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This type strongly believes that high interest rates are the main cause of the problems of
the forest products markets. The “realistic entrepreneurs” also acknowledge consumer
insolvency and high transport tariffs to be primary problems.
They believe that public (government) demand does not make any difference. Managers
belonging to this type do not consider the weak domestic (intra-regional) demand to be
an important problem. Realistic entrepreneurs do not worry about the financial re-
sources and credit availability. To them this is not the main reason for production de-
crease.
For the “realistic entrepreneurs” prices of forest products are not higher than they
should be. This is a difference compared with the opinion of the “demand accusers.”
But like the latter group they do not believe that substitutes for wood products can sig-
nificantly influence the demand.
It is likely that this manager type exists in regions where enterprises do not heavily rely
on the old system of goszakaz and instead look at the market crisis in the forestry in-
dustry mainly as a problem of insufficient liquidity and high interest rates.
Regional Descriptions
The result of the analysis (Table 1) reveals that Novosibirsk and Tomsk load high on
factor two, while Gorno-Altai and Kemerovo seem to be unified under factor 1. How
can this be explained? Many explanations are of course possible. Since the Q-analysis is
based on a few persons we can only indicate likely explanations that should be further
examined.
During the interviews some quantitative data describing the situation in the regions were
collected as well. The picture that emerges from these data of the overall situation in the
selected regions to some extent may assist us in an analysis of the result of the Q-
analysis. Obviously, the regions that were included in our study have a quite different
resource base and some differences in institutional structure. One of the underlying as-
sumptions of the study is that the geographical location of the region and its transporta-
tion situation may influence the attitudes towards the problems of forest products mar-
kets.
For example, Tomsk is a region rich in forest resources and it is an important producer
of roundwood, veneer, lumber, and particle board. Tomsk region is the home of several
large-scale forest-industrial complexes (Tomsk, Asino, Kargasok). The economic crisis
has influenced production and resulted in a decrease of industrial wood supply from 6.2
(1991) to 1.65 (1995) million cubic meters. However, fiber board production increased
from 107.2 to 128 thousand cubic meters (20% growth) between 1991 and 1995. Novo-
sibirsk has fewer forests and only a few wood processing plants. The dominating type of
forest industry is sawmills and furniture production. Lately, lumber production has been
expanding on the basis of timber imports. However, for industrial wood production is
still decreasing, from 876 to 203 thousand cubic meters (1991 to 1995) and for lumber
from 598 to 210 thousand cubic meters. In 1991, less than 1% of the population in ap-
propriate age was employed in the forest industry. So, the forest industry does not play
any important role for the regional economic development.
Because of the high demand from regional forest industries the Kemerovo region can
simultaneously be characterized as a region rich in forests and as a region with a lack of
forests. Forest resources are unevenly located throughout the region: 70% are in the east
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part, 25% in the north, and 5% in the west. The forest sector in the Kemerovo region
produces a substantial output of lumber. During 1991-1995 the industrial wood de-
creased from 2,25 million to 570 thousand cubic meters; lumber from 1.34 million to
392 thousand cubic meters, and plywood production decreased from 4.7 thousand to 2
thousand cubic meters. The Altai region is considered to be relatively rich in forest re-
sources. The main industries are sawnwood, some lumber, plywood and furniture. The
forest sector in Altai region is characterized by several small enterprises. This has to do
with the scattered location of the resource, its mountainous geography and its weak
transportation system. The economic crisis has resulted in a decrease in industrial wood
production from 1,085 to 158 thousand cubic meters, from 467 to 272 thousand cubic
meters in lumber.
Table 1. Forest-production volumes for four regions 1995.
Products Units Novosibirsk Tomsk Altai Kemerovo
Harvest mln. cub. m 0,28 2,36 0,321 0,73
Industrial Wood mln. cub. m 0,20 1,65 0,158 0,57
Lumber mln. cub. m 0,21 0,80 0,272 0,39
Plywood thsd. cub. m 0,20 5,70 0,006 1,80
Particle Board thsd. cub. m 0,00 128,10 0,002 0,00
Fiber Board mln  sq. m 0,00 0,00 0,000 0,00
Cellulose thsd. ton 0,00 0,00 0,000 0,00
Paper thsd. ton 0,00 0,00 0,000 0,00
Cardboard thsd. ton 0,00 10,40 0,000 2,70
Source: The Blam database, 1995, IIASA.
In terms of infrastructure the Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Kemerovo, Sak-
halin and Altai regions have a greater concentration of marketing and consulting firms.
This concentration should, however, be weighted by the area of the respective regions
and their urbanization level to provide precise results.





Source: Based on data from Biznes Karta 97.
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When we compare the production characteristics of the regions in which the respective
types of answers dominate, we find that the main difference is that particle board is not
produced in regions where the first type – the “demand accusers” – dominates.
Regions that are relatively rich in forests, like the Kemerovo and the Altai regions, have
some similarity in the location of their forest resources in mountainous areas. This may
help to explain the fact that these two regions were grouped in the same type. Although
the Novosibirsk and Tomsk regions have a different resource base it is interesting to
note that managers from the two regions grouped together to form the second manager
type. It can be noted that both regions are in the “realistic entrepreneur” group not be-
cause of their geography or the volume of their forest resources, as was the case with
Kemerovo and Altai. The similarity of opinions about financial issues between the man-
agers from Novosibirsk and Tomsk may be explained by the fact that there are quite a
few funds and support programs in operation in these regions. They also have a similar
infrastructure, more developed and powerful financial centers, international connections
and transport. Transportation and the availability of funding are, however, the main
concern of managers in both regions.
The geographical location of the two regions may have exerted an influence on this
factor as well as similarities in the political and economic environment. In both the No-
vosibirsk and the Tomsk regions problems with domestic (intra-regional) demand were
not considered significant. Potentially, domestic demand is high.
However, on the basis of data on merely one representative from each region, it is not
possible to draw any reliable conclusions. Thus, this type of reasoning might be fruitful
in a more extended investigation.
Conclusions
With the limited time and number of respondents available this pilot study can only
provide conclusions of a very tentative nature. However, the result of the Q-analysis
indicate that there might exist two main types of attitudes (“demand accusers” and “re-
alistic entrepreneurs”) towards the problems besetting the Russian forest products mar-
kets. The study shows that Q-methodology may be used as a tool of subjective qualita-
tive research through which it is possible to obtain a better understanding of attitudes
and trends prevailing among actors on the forest products markets. The two identified
manager types seem to accurately reflect the current situation, notwithstanding the fact
that only a limited sample was available. Quite possibly the regions represented here
happen to be the “key” regions. Since Q-methodology does not require many respon-
dents (it is rather the diversity of opinions that is most important for identifying existing
typologies) it may be that the two types of opinions that we have identified would hold
true as a description of forest enterprise managers’ attitudes in most Siberian regions.
In this study two main groups of attitudes towards the prevailing market situation have
been identified. The first group has a belief in a state demand system and domestic mar-
kets are considered important. The second group mostly blames the credit system and
the transport tariffs for all the problems in the forest sector. Of course, all of the men-
tioned problems exist and need to be taken care of. However, it is interesting to note the
different importance assigned to the various problems by the two manager types that
were identified in our analysis.
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However, several lessons can be learned from this Q-methodological study of market
attitudes.
1. The study provides important insight that might be useful for the understanding of
how various policies may be received. For example, the fact that one group blames
the problems that the forest market faces on the lack of government demand (gosza-
kaz) may explain why certain government policies for the forest sector might be un-
favorably received by some actors in the market and favorably by others.
2. Taking different types of market attitudes into account is important for the identifi-
cation of efficient institutional policies. In order to design new and efficient institu-
tions it is important to understand what different groups in society (e.g. forest enter-
prise managers) really think about proposed changes and the functioning of the mar-
ket mechanism.
3. The two types discussed in this paper may provide meaningful categories for under-
standing the nature of economic behavior on the part of enterprise managers in the
Siberian forest sector.
4. Finally, typologies, like the ones identified here, provide a kind of “control” of the
description of a real situation. Thus it can be argued that it is important to note that
prevailing attitudes towards a marketization of the forest sector might differ between
regions.
The analysis of the results also allows some conclusions regarding changes in the design
and performance of further, more extended studies of the present topic. If the hypothesis
of geographical location and economic situation should be maintained the following is-
sues must be given further consideration:
• First, the regions have to be selected with a view to their geographical location as
well as the economic conditions of their regional forest complex. It might be desir-
able to investigate all 28 regions of Siberia. Furthermore, not only would it be inter-
esting to include respondents from different geographical areas but also from dif-
fering positions in society, e.g. both workers and managers of an enterprise. How-
ever, the most representative regions for further investigation seem to be Kras-
noyarsk, Buryatia, Khakassia, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Tyumen, Kemerovo, Yakutiya
and Altai (since these regions differ in forest resources availability, geographical lo-
cation, infrastructure and existing policies).
• Second, the number of questions should be increased (to at least 40). It would be
interesting to include questions about, for instance, financial industrial groups
(FIGs) and their organizational structure as well as questions on the legal and insti-
tutional structure. Another recommendation would be to exclude statements that are
relatively uncontroversial.
• Third, the best way to avoid problems in connection with the registering of data
during the interviews would be to conduct a so-called Lickert scaled interview that
will provide the most efficient and precise measure of attitudes, which, in turn, will
become an input for the Q-methodology software. If a Lickert scale were used,
questions would need to be modified to become strong controversial statements.
This pilot study has demonstrated that it is possible to use attitude measurements and Q-
analysis to identify the situation in the market. Such a study, carried out with a larger
sample, could provide information on the attitudes of main actors in the market. If a
further study would like to emphasize the “political side” of attitudes in the forest sec-
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tor, the sample of respondents should include different political officials in addition to
the others already mentioned.
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1. I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be very crucial for my en-
terprise.
2. In my opinion, absence of demand from the government does not destroy successful
business operation for my forest enterprise.
3. The biggest problem for forest business is the difficulty of obtaining credits and in-
vestments.
4. I agree that if forest enterprises used more qualified labor they would perform much
better in the market.
5. In my opinion, the fact that prices for forest products are too high causes the de-
crease of the consumption.
6. Use of the forest products substitutes results in the decrease of consumption.
7. Low level of available consumers’ funds caused the decrease of the consumption of
forest products.
8. Increased prices for the raw materials and energy influence the situation at the mar-
ket.
9. A smaller volume of trade with the former CIS countries is the reason for the low
export and market volumes.
10. Competition with the foreign producers causes a low level of demand for Russian
forest products.
11. I believe that the low quality of our forest products is the reason for a low level of
demand.
12. In my opinion, the trade with Western countries is growing and positively influences
the demand at the market of forest products.
13. Competition with local producers results in the increased level of demand for forest
products.
14. Current transport tariffs system does not allow for successful development of the
market demand.
15. Statistical data of forest product trade, which is not represented by the statistical re-
ports, contains more than 30%.
16. The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest industry consumption.
17. The structure of the export market has been changed in favor of Asian countries.
18. Energy costs are extremely high at an average forest enterprise and are the cause of
the high prices.
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19. High interest rates on credits and finances provide for problems in forest industry
production.
20. In my opinion more than 50% of all the trade of forest products at the enterprise is
done by barter or through the ‘third person.”
21. I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises there are marketing specialist
and branches.
22. Change in the ownership really has changed the volumes of forest production and
trade.
23. Production activities are well regulated by the existing laws.
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Appendix II.
Correlation Matrix between Sorts
SORTS          1   2   3   4
  1 nski      100  41 -13   9
  2 tomsk      41 100  16  54
  3 Gorno-al  -13  16 100  44
  4 kemerovo    9  54  44 100
Unrotated Factor Matrix
                Factors
                   1         2         3         4
 SORTS
  1 nsk           -.4061    -.7893    -.4300    -.1648
  2 tomsk         -.8334    -.3080     .2464     .3873
  3 Gorno-al      -.5306     .6804    -.4890     .1281
  4 kemerovo      -.8454     .2557     .2706    -.3830
 Eigenvalues      1.8557    1.2462     .5580     .3402
 % expl.Var.          46        31        14         9
Factor Matrix With an X Indicating a Defining Factor
                Loadings
 QSORT             1         2
  1 nsk          -.1759     .8701X
  2 tomsk         .4584     .7610X
  3 Gorno-al      .8393X   -.1999
  4 kemerovo      .8199X    .3284
 % expl.Var.         40        37
Free Distribution Data Results
Q-SORTS       MEAN     ST.DEV.
      1       .000       1.758
      2       .000       1.758
      3       .000       1.758
      4       .000       1.758
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Appendix III.
Rank Statement Totals with Each Factor
                                                           Factors
No.  Statement                                                No.      1          2
  1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region     1    2.01   1  -1.32  20
  2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government     2     .40   6  -1.55  23
  3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in diff    3     .40   6  -1.32  21
  4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem    4   -1.65  21  -1.54  22
  5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest prod    5    1.34   3   -.21  14
  6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the d    6   -1.70  22    .00  13
  7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  d    7     .23  12   1.55   2
  8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make    8    1.70   2   1.32   4
  9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries     9     .36   8    .00  11
 10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low leve   10     .04  13   -.22  15
 11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products    11     .67   4   1.10   5
 12  I think that export to Western countries is growing      12     .00  15    .00  11
 13  Competition with local producers results in the increa   13    -.31  16    .00  13
 14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for su   14    -.98  20   1.54   3
 15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is no   15    -.36  17   -.44  17
 16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest i   16    -.40  18    .22   8
 17  The structure of the export market has been changed in   17     .31  10    .66   6
 18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest    18     .31  10    .22   9
 19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide fo   19     .36   8   1.76   1
 20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ      20     .27  11   -.66  18
 21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises   21    -.98  20    .44   7
 22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums   22     .00  15   -.44  17
 23  Production activities are regulated well by the existi   23   -2.01  23  -1.11  19
Correlations Between Factors
               1       2
    1     1.0000   .1303
    2      .1303  1.0000
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Appendix IV.
Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor   1
 No.  Statement                                                    No.     Z-SCORES
   1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be    1        2.009
   8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i    8        1.695
   5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products     5        1.339
  11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th   11         .670
   3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc    3         .398
   2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does     2         .398
   9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th    9         .356
  19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro   19         .356
  17  The structure of the export market has been changed in favo   17         .314
  18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter   18         .314
  20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ           20         .271
   7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea    7         .229
  10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of    10         .042
  12  I think that export to Western countries is growing           12         .000
  22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of     22         .000
  13  Competition with local producers results in the increased l   13        -.314
  15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep   15        -.356
  16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust   16        -.398
  21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther   21        -.983
  14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success   14        -.983
   4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for     4       -1.653
   6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea    6       -1.695
  23  Production activities are regulated well by the existing la   23       -2.009
Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor   2
 No.  Statement                                                    No.     Z-SCORES
  19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro   19        1.765
   7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea    7        1.547
  14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success   14        1.542
   8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i    8        1.324
  11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th   11        1.102
  17  The structure of the export market has been changed in favo   17         .662
  21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther   21         .444
  16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust   16         .222
  18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter   18         .218
  12  I think that export to Western countries is growing           12         .000
   9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th    9         .000
  13  Competition with local producers results in the increased l   13        -.004
   6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea    6        -.004
   5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products     5        -.213
  10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of    10        -.222
  15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep   15        -.440
  22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of     22        -.440
  20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ           20        -.662
  23  Production activities are regulated well by the existing la   23       -1.107
   1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be    1       -1.320
   3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc    3       -1.324
   4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for     4       -1.542
   2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does     2       -1.547
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Appendix V.
Descending Array of Differences Between Factors   1 and   2
 No.  Statement                                                     No.   Type 1   Type 2  Difference
   1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be    1    2.009    -1.320      3.329
   2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does     2     .398    -1.547      1.945
   3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc    3     .398    -1.324      1.723
   5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products     5    1.339     -.213      1.552
  20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ           20     .271     -.662       .933
  22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of     22     .000     -.440       .440
   8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i    8    1.695     1.324       .371
   9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th    9     .356      .000       .356
  10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of    10     .042     -.222       .265
  18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter   18     .314      .218       .096
  15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep   15    -.356     -.440       .084
  12  I think that export to Western countries is growing           12     .000      .000       .000
   4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for     4   -1.653    -1.542      -.110
  13  Competition with local producers results in the increased l   13    -.314     -.004      -.309
  17  The structure of the export market has been changed in favo   17     .314      .662      -.349
  11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th   11     .670     1.102      -.433
  16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust   16    -.398      .222      -.621
  23  Production activities are regulated well by the existing la   23   -2.009    -1.107      -.902
   7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea    7     .229     1.547     -1.318
  19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro   19     .356     1.765     -1.409
  21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther   21    -.983      .444     -1.428
   6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea    6   -1.695     -.004     -1.691
  14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success   14    -.983     1.542     -2.525
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Appendix VI.
Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement
                                                                         Factor Arrays
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2
  1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be    1        3     -2
  2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does     2        1     -3
  3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc    3        1     -2
  4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for     4       -2     -3
  5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products     5        2      0
  6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea    6       -3      0
  7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea    7        0      3
  8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i    8        3      2
  9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th    9        1      0
 10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of    10        0     -1
 11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th   11        2      2
 12  I think that export to Western countries is growing           12       -1      0
 13  Competition with local producers results in the increased l   13       -1      0
 14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success   14       -2      2
 15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep   15       -1     -1
 16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust   16       -1      1
 17  The structure of the export market has been changed in favo   17        0      1
 18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter   18        0      1
 19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro   19        1      3
 20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ           20        0     -1
 21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther   21       -2      1
 22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of     22       -1     -1
 23  Production activities are regulated well by the existing la   23       -3     -2
Variance =  2.957  St. Dev. =  1.719
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Appendix VII.
Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. Disagree-
ment (Variance across normalized Factor Scores)
                                                                         Factor Arrays
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2
 12  I think that export to Western countries is growing           12       -1      0
 15  Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep   15       -1     -1
 18  Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter   18        0      1
  4  Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for     4       -2     -3
 10  Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of    10        0     -1
 13  Competition with local producers results in the increased l   13       -1      0
 17  The structure of the export market has been changed in favo   17        0      1
  9  Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th    9        1      0
  8  Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i    8        3      2
 11  I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th   11        2      2
 22  Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of     22       -1     -1
 16  The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust   16       -1      1
 23  Production activities are regulated well by the existing la   23       -3     -2
 20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ           20        0     -1
  7  Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea    7        0      3
 19  High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro   19        1      3
 21  I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther   21       -2      1
  5  In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products     5        2      0
  6  Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea    6       -3      0
  3  The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc    3        1     -2
  2  In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does     2        1     -3
 14  Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success   14       -2      2
  1  I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be    1        3     -2
Factor Characteristics
                                     Factors
                                       1        2
No. of Defining Variables              2        2
Average Rel. Coef.                    .800     .800
Composite Reliability                 .889     .889
S.E. of Factor Scores                 .333     .333
Standard Errors for Differences in Normalized Factor Scores
(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors)
            Factors         1        2
                1          .471     .471
                2          .471     .471
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Appendix VIII.
Distinguishing Statements for Factor  1
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are Shown.
                                                                        Factors
                                                                              1           2
 No. Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE
   1 I consider the problem of no demand inside the region to be   1      3  2.01*   -2 -1.32
   5 In my opinion,  the fact that   prices for forest products    5      2  1.34*    0  -.21
   3 The biggest problem for forest  business ,  is in difficulc   3      1   .40*   -2 -1.32
   2 In my opinion, absence of  demand from the government does    2      1   .40*   -3 -1.55
  19 High interest rates on credits and finances provide for pro  19      1   .36*    3  1.76
  20 In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ          20      0   .27    -1  -.66
   7 Low level of available consumers’ funds  caused the  decrea   7      0   .23*    3  1.55
  21 I consider that in more than 50% of forest enterprises ther  21     -2  -.98*    1   .44
  14 Current transport tariffs system does not allow for success  14     -2  -.98*    2  1.54
   6 Use of the forest products substitutes result in the decrea   6     -3 -1.70*    0   .00
Consensus Statements  --  Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors.
All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged With an * are also Non-
Significant at P>.05.
                                                                         Factors
                                                                              1           2
 No.  Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE
   4* Absence of qualified labour create the biggest problem for    4     -2 -1.65    -3 -1.54
   8* Increased prices for the raw materials and energy make an i   8      3  1.70     2  1.32
   9* Smaller volums of trade with the former CIS countries is th   9      1   .36     0   .00
  10* Competition with the foreign producers causes low level of   10      0   .04    -1  -.22
  11* I believe that the low quality of our forest products is th  11      2   .67     2  1.10
  12* I think that export to Western countries is growing          12     -1   .00     0   .00
  13* Competition with local producers results in the increased l  13     -1  -.31     0   .00
  15* Statistical data of forest products trade, which is not rep  15     -1  -.36    -1  -.44
  16* The non-wood products provide less than 5% of forest indust  16     -1  -.40     1   .22
  17* The structure of the export market has been changed in favo  17      0   .31     1   .66
  18* Energy costs  are extremely high at an average forest enter  18      0   .31     1   .22
  20  In my opinion 100% of all the trade of forest produ          20      0   .27    -1  -.66
  22* Change in the ownership really have changed the volums of    22     -1   .00    -1  -.44




Choose the number of the routine you want to run and enter it.
1 - STATES   - Enter (or edit) the file of statements
2 - QENTER   - Enter q sorts (new or continued)
3-  QCENT    - Perform a Centroid factor analysis
3 - QPCA     - Perform a Principal Components factor analysis
5 - QROTATE  - Perform a manual rotation of the factors
6 - QVARIMAX - Perform a varimax rotation of the factors
7 - QANALYZE - Perform the final Q analysis of the rotated factors
X - Exit from QMETHODS
  Last Routine Run Successfully - (Initial)
(1) STATES
Choosing option States provides the possibility to enter the state-
ments. It is possible to use the already created file with the state-
ments.
Every statement must be typed as a single line (without empty lines
between them). Note that all records will get truncated to 60 charac-
ters, since that is the maximum for statement text in PQMethod.
(2) QENTER
QENTER is used to enter data directly from the q-sorts you have admin-
istered. The file that is created by QENTER can be created by another
source, but it must be modified for entry to QCORR and etc.
The details needed will be:
1. The total number of statements that were sorted.
2. The value of the leftmost column of the q-sort. It is assumed that the
leftmost column has a lower value than the rightmost column, so that
values will range from, say, -4 to +4, or from 1 to 9. The maximal
number of columns is 13, with values ranging from either -6 to +6, or
from 1 to 13. In general, there should be an unequal number of catego-
ries to provide for a neutral midpoint. If that is not the case,
PQMethod 2.0 now issues a warning only, but accepts the design.
3. The rightmost column value (see above).
4. The number of rows in each column, from left to right. This should
exactly match your q-sort design. The design itself should be symmet-
ric -- that is, the number of rows on the left should be the same as
those of the corresponding columns on the right. In addition, the de-
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sign must be unimodal — that is, the number of rows must not decrease
from either left or right to the center.
(3) QCENT
QCENT first takes the rawdata file created by QENTER and computes and
outputs a correlation matrix in a file with file-name extension .cor.
Then it create an unrotated factor loadings file (.unr), which is cre-
ated by the application of the Centroid factor analysis process. As a
default, QCENT suggests the 'magical number' of seven Centroids to ex-
tract. However, you can change that; the maximal number of factors
PQMethod can handle is eight. In fact, under normal conditions, there
is no good reason for selecting less than 7 factors, since upon rota-
tion of factors you can choose how many of the unrotated factors to
use.
 (4) QPCA
Principal Components analysis (PCA) is an alternative to Centroid fac-
toring. Centroid analysis, the method of choice for Stephenson and his
followers, is not much used outside the Q community nowadays, whereas
PCA is the default method of factor extraction in statistical packages
like SPSS.
Like QCENT, QPCA computes first the correlation matrix, and then the
unrotated factor matrix file (.unr). QPCA always computes eight fac-
tors, which is the maximum number of factors PQMethod can process.
This does not mean that you have to take into account all eight fac-
tors for either judgmental or Varimax rotation which follow later.
After extraction of the factors the full table of Eigenvalues and re-
spective percentages of explained variance is displayed on the screen,
and also written to the unrotated-factors file (.unr) for later in-
spection.
(5) QROTATE
Now it is time to rotate the factors. You have two options: you can
rotate the factors by hand, or you can perform a varimax rotation. You
would not normally do both, unless you wanted to compare the methods.
If you choose QROTATE to rotate the factors yourself, you are first
asked if this is a continuation. If you say 'no', then the file output
by QCENT or QPCA, respectively, the unrotated factors file (.unr),
will be the only input. If you say this is a continuation, then an in-
termediate file (.hro) created the last time you ran QROTATE is used
instead. In either case, at the end of this session, a new intermedi-
ate file is written out, and you always have the option of running
QROTATE again and using either this file or the original file of unro-
tated factors (if you want to start over).
 (6) QVARIMAX
If you choose not to rotate the factors yourself, you can choose a
varimax rotation. QVARIMAX takes in the unrotated matrix file (.unr)
created by QCENT or QPCA, and asks for the number of factors you wish
to rotate. If you just press the <ENTER> key, all unrotated factors
will be rotated to the Varimax criterion. After the VARIMAX rotation
is performed, you are then given the option to do further rotating by
hand if you want, or you can simply flag the factors and write them
out, just as you would if you had done the entire rotation by hand.
See chapter (6) ROTATE for details.
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(7) QANALYZE
Finally, you need to run QANALYZE to give you a complete analysis of
the q-sorts you collected. There is no input that should be required
of you if you have used PQMethod to get to this point.
When run, QANALYZE creates a written report in a listing file (file
extension .lis) that is actually sent to disk, just like all the other
files in this system. You can view this file with your favorite file
viewer or editor / text program. You might wish to edit and, specifi-




Lars Carlsson and Mats-Olov Olsson
The previous chapters of this report have demonstrated that a great number of the prob-
lems and opportunities that are discussed in relation to the Russian forest sector are, in
fact, representative of the transition process in general. Like most other areas in the So-
viet economy the forest sector was also ran as a typical top-down enterprise, the short-
comings of which must now be taken care of. However, these changes are associated
with many problems which essentially have an institutional character. The basic prob-
lem is to change the “rules of the game,” but there exist many hurdles along the road. In
order to get a better understanding of the transition of the Russian forest sector three
main themes should be addressed.
The first of these is “the legacy of history,” namely the general problem of altering old
patterns of governance, of collective and individual action. Even before the revolution
property rights of the Russian forests were closely tied to the State. As a consequence,
after the downfall of the Soviet Union, there exist no other natural inheritors than the
State itself. In other East European countries the descendents of the pre-communist
property holders have claimed their former property. Thus, in these countries some pri-
vatizations of forest lands have taken place. In Russia, however, formally no such pos-
sibilities exist and the new State has preserved major parts of the old governance struc-
ture related to the forest sector. At the same time this structure must be, and is actually
being, reorganized. However, in order to gain legitimacy for any new order of things the
“new” authorities have to demonstrate that this order is better, more effective, etc. than
the old one. Since to succeed the forest sector is totally dependent on these change ef-
forts this would be a most crucial part for the transition.
A second, but related, theme to be addressed is the structural reorganization of the forest
sector. A major problem is how to assess (or predict) to what extent certain types of or-
ganizational features support or obstruct the transition towards a market economy.
When history can provide an “answer book” judgements might be easy, but for those
who are in the middle of the process no such guidelines exist (Carlsson & Olsson,
1998).
The task of creating new organizations for collective action in the forest sector is a
rather problematic and, arguably, even a paradoxical enterprise. On the one hand, new
organizational solutions must be developed. On the other hand, most of those who are
supposed to achieve these changes and populate the new units are the same persons who
constituted the system which is now being abandoned. Even if it would be desirable, it
is unlikely that a conscious “replacement strategy” would succeed. Knowledge and
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skills reside in people, not primarily in organizational features, and in many branches of
the forest sector special competence is needed. Accordingly, most of the building mate-
rial for the new institutional edifices consists of old “bricks.” Therefore, in order to
promote the reorganization of the Russian forest sector, one has to put more emphasis
on the individual.
Consequently, the third theme to be focused is the role of the individual. Institutional
change in the Russian forest sector has the character of a chicken-and-egg problem. In
order to change the “rules of the game,” i.e., the institutional framework, people must
change their behavior, their norms, and attitudes. Simultaneously, the changing of
norms, etc., is basically dependent on the institutional framework itself. From where,
then, is the change supposed to come, from outside, from some external force not ex-
posed to the logic of the rest of the players? Of course, this is not possible. The reor-
ganization of the Russian forest sector must be carried out by managers, industrialists,
policymakers, scientists, and others who are in many cases already involved in the for-
est sector. Hopefully, contemporary research about the issues outlined in this report may
give these actors new insights and ideas which will be useful for the renewal of the Rus-
sian forest sector.
To sum up. In order to get a better understanding of the Russian forest sector as well as
of the prospects of making it beneficial for the economic development one has to pay
attention to the historical legacy. Such a heritage often decides the “degrees of freedom”
for the actors. Second, one also has to understand that organizational renewal is a more
complicated process than just reorganizing or instituting new units and agencies. Third,
it must be appreciated that institutional change goes along with change of the individu-
als and vise versa. Finally, it should be noted that all three themes discussed above can
be subsumed under the broader heading of institutional change. The puzzle is to know
how this can and should be preformed in the Russian forest sector. How can institu-
tional change be conceptualized and understood?
The Russian Forest Sector, a Laboratory of
Institutional Change
The Russian forest sector provides an interesting case for analyses that might contribute
significantly to our understanding of how institutional change takes place in society. It
is a well-known fact that institutions may change through dramatic events, such as
revolutions and national subjugation caused by military force. The sudden and profound
disintegration of the Soviet State has many similarities with such events. However, in-
stitutional change is a continuous process and in most countries such changes take place
quite peacefully. This is also the situation in Russia today.
The very definition of institutions as a relatively stable set of rules-in-use indicates a
certain permanence, but systems of rules are, and must constantly be, changing due to
technological development, population growth, etc. Thus, it is obvious that – even in a
very stable society – it is necessary to allow some degree of instability. Otherwise no
institutional renewal and no economic and social development would take place. The
Russian forest sector provides an interesting “laboratory” of institutional change. How-
ever, it is not evident how these sweeping institutional changes should be preformed and
understood. David Weimer (1995: 6) uses the phrase “the puzzle of institutional
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change.” He suggests two alternative ways of conceptualizing the mechanisms of insti-
tutional change in society.
The first view, which is built on Douglass North’s (1991) theory, considers changes as
caused by actors’ response to shifts in relative prices and preferences. In this way new
institutional arrangements that enhance economic growth are constantly created in soci-
ety. We can think about these changes as a driving force behind economic development.
Nevertheless, “bad” or inefficient institutions – not promoting economic development –
might develop and persist over significant periods of time. Two features can explain
this. The first is that it might be too expensive to move to more efficient arrangements
because substantial investments have already been made in the existing institutional
setting. This is the so-called “path dependency” argument. A second reason might be
that those in favor of the existing, but inefficient, system have a bargaining power and
can block those who might benefit from a change. The winners, furthermore, find it too
expensive to compensate the losers of the desirable change.
The second view, which is based on Knight (1992), sees institutional change as a by-
product caused by conflicting interests. According to this theory, changes in institu-
tional arrangements have a tendency to take place when the changes favor those with
advantageous bargaining power. Thus, it cannot be expected that institutions automati-
cally change for the better.
Weimer (1995: 6) concludes that according to North’s theory inefficiencies can only be
assessed ex post while Knight’s theory allows for making those assessments ex ante.
However, there are also a number of other ways of understanding the mechanisms of
institutional change. The application of property rights theory is one alternative, policy
making theory is another. In addition there are numerous theories that try to explain the
emergence, as well as the relative permanence, of rules, norms and conventions in soci-
ety; from game theory to psychological theories of attitudinal change.
A general problem with empirical research, however, is that scientific conclusions only
can be drawn retrospectively. Empirical research is subjected to the fact that something
must first take place before it can be analyzed. What we are observing in contemporary
Russia, its forest sector included, is a society involved in a process of institutional
change that might not be conceptualized by the use of contemporary theories and the
effects of which might only be properly understood in a distant future. Thus, the
changes in Russia might be so special that they cannot be analyzed by existing theories.
Therefore, some would argue, the task of research should merely be to “collect data” in
order to construct such theories in the future. However, such an attitude misses three
important features of empirical research:
• In the first place, no data collection can actually be performed which is not (explic-
itly or implicitly) based on some kind of theory.
• Research should be able to explain and provide a better understanding of what is
going on in front of our eyes.
• Empirical research should provide the possibility to influence ongoing activities and
make things “better.”
In previous chapters of this report a number of important issues have been raised that
call for more and deeper analysis. Some features of the Russian forest sector are under-
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standable by the use of existing theory while other are more problematic. This was, for
example, demonstrated in Barbara Lehmbruch’s analysis.
With reference to the issues discussed in the first four chapters of this report, our three
statements above and the previous discussion about institutional change we can con-
clude the following. In order to change the Russian forest sector one must gather a bet-
ter understanding of its factual structure, its relations to other sectors as well as of the
overall changes in the Russian society. In the next section we will suggest an agenda for
such research.
Institutional Analysis for Institutional Change
Suggested Lines of Inquiry
• More research is needed in order to understand the structure of, and the ongoing
changes in, the Russian forest sector.
• Given the assumption that internal as well as external factors will influence the on-
going reorganization of the Russian forest sector the research should have a com-
parative character. A number of studies focusing on different geographical areas of
Russia should be conducted. These studies would make it possible to estimate the
relative success of the transition.
• The research should have a multi-level character. In-depth studies focusing on local
and regional aspects of the forest sector should be complemented with national and
international level analyses.
• Research results should be “packed” and presented in a format that could easily be
utilized by stakeholders, policy makers, and others directly involved in, or related to,
the reorganization of the Russian forest sector.
Specific Questions and Issues to Be Addressed
Property rights: How should the current system of dual property rights to forest lands be
understood? What problems and possibilities are associated with this type of owner-
ship? What types of property rights systems related to forest lands have been developed
during the course of the transition? What is the function of these property rights re-
gimes?
Legal issues: How does the current legal system affect the forest sector? What are the
means and possibilities to implement the rule of law? What relations exist between dif-
ferent kinds of formal rules – constitutional and other – regulating the forest sector? To
what extent and in what ways do different rules support or contradict each other. What
changes are needed?
Taxes: What is the exact configuration of the system of taxes that affects forest enter-
prises, investors, and other actors in the Russian forest sector? How can and should this
system be refined?
Financing: What financial structures apply to the forest sector? What is the general sup-
ply or availability of economic resources for investments, etc? To what extent are sys-
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tems of “quasi money” developed, e.g., how widespread is the barter system? In what
ways do the existing barter system affect the policymaking process?
Trade: Are there significant differences in how well effective trade with forest products
have been developed in different parts of the federation? What are the functions of cen-
tral trading and export organizations? How do their activities benefit regional develop-
ment of trade and the development of local competence?
Infrastructure: What does the transportation system that is supposed to serve the forest
sector look like? What problems and obstacles for development exist? What is the mag-
nitude of investments needed in order to modernize the sector? How does the current
transportation policy affect the forest sector? What should be done to reorganize the
transportation sector? What other types of infrastructure investments, such as informa-
tion technology, are essential or desirable for the forest sector?
Supply of wood: How does the new system of stumpage fees, leasing, and auctions
work? Are there significant differences in how they work in different parts of the fed-
eration? In what way do these systems affect the forests, their maintenance, regenera-
tion, etc.? If significant differences are found, how can these be explained?
Management and other professional skills and capacities: What kinds of competence do
actors involved in the forest sector have and what improvements are essential for the
development of the sector?
Norms and attitudes among stakeholders: What types of attitudes towards entrepreneur-
ship, management, and other central aspects of a market economy do managers, indus-
trialists, and policy makers have? In what ways do these qualities affect the performance
in the forest sector?
General attitudes among people: What is the level of understanding among citizens –
particularly in typical forest communities – concerning changes to be made in order to
establish a society based on the principles of a market economy?
Technological renewal and institutional features: The question of the general and spe-
cific relation between institutional features and technological renewal of the forest sec-
tor should be addressed. Under what circumstances does technological development
take place and what are the obstacles for such development?
The social importance of the forest sector: What is the structure of monoculture and
how widespread is this feature? To what extent and in what ways are single communi-
ties and regions depending on the forest sector? What strategies, if any, have been de-
veloped to tackle the situation? For example, how widespread is the use of subsidiary
sources of income among people? How does this affect land use and the standard of
living?
Social issues: What is the structure and volume of forest enterprise involvement in the
provision of public goods and social services? What hurdles do these engagements raise
for the renewal of the sector? In what ways can these systems be dismantled without
creating unacceptable welfare losses and social unrest?
Political administrative organizations: What solutions have been developed in order to
provide a political administrative framework beneficial for the forest sector? Are there
differences and similarities in how this framework is organized in different parts of
Russia? What conclusions can be drawn from these differences? To what extent is the
forest sector politicized, and, is this for the better or for the worse?
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